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Civil Right
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Although education has always existed at the epicenter of the battlefor civil rights,
federal and state law and policy fail to protect education as a civil right. This
collective failure harms a wide array of our national interests, including our
foundational interests in an educated democracy and a productive workforce. This
Article proposes innovative reforms to both federal and state law and policy that
would protect education as a civil right. It also explains why the U.S. approach to
education federalism will require legal reforms by both levels of government to
protect education as a civil right.
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INTRODUCTION

Education has long stood at the epicenter of the battle for civil rights. Courthouses,
school board meetings, and schools, along with institutions of higher education, have
served as the battlegrounds where conflicts raged about the constitutionality of
educational opportunities that were never separate but equal.1 Today, education
remains a critical civil rights issue of our time because a child's education far too
often still varies in quality depending on her or his race, national origin, class, and
neighborhood. 2 Undoubtedly, disparate educational opportunities tailored to student
needs are essential for an effective education system. However, avoidable disparities
in educational opportunities that are based upon the accidents of birth, such as wealth,

1. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 16-19, 41-46, 55-57 (2007); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the
Promise of Brown: Understanding and Remedying How the Supreme Court
Reconstitutionalized Segregated Schools, 88 N.C. L. REV. 787, 795-839 (2010).
2. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Essential Questions Regarding a FederalRight to
Education, in A FEDERAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR OUR

DEMOCRACY 1, 3-7 (Kimberly Jenkins Robinson ed., 2019).
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race, and geography, serve as powerful engines of injustice in the United States.
These disparities matter because they harm our national interests in a knowledgeable
and engaged citizenry, a robust economy, a well-prepared military, and a just
society.'
Inequitable educational disparities endure in the United States in part because our
nation lacks the comprehensive legal architecture to protect education as a civil right.
This omission persists despite more than two decades of our nation's leaders framing
education as a critical civil rights issue of our time and confirming the importance of
equal educational opportunity. For instance, President George W. Bush stated that
"[n]ow our challenge is to make sure that every child has a fair chance to succeed in
life. That is why education is the great civil rights issue of our time." 4 President
Barack Obama stated that "[t]he best possible education is the single most important
factor in determining whether they succeed. But it's also what will determine
whether we succeed. It's the key to opportunity. It is the civil rights issue of our
time." 5 President Donald Trump also has stated that "[e]ducation is the civil rights
issue of our time."6 Other political leaders have made similar statements.7 At a time
of partisan rancor and gridlock, it is important to recognize that both parties agree
that a civil rights framework provides the proper lens for thinking about education.

3.

THE EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE COMMISSION, FOR EACH AND EVERY CHILD: A

STRATEGY FOR EDUCATION EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE 12-15 (2013); Kimberly Jenkins

Robinson, An American Dream Deferred:A FederalRight to Education,in A FEDERAL RIGHT
TO EDUCATION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 327, 32728, 332; Gerard Robinson, The Closing of the MilitaryMind, AEIDEAS BLOG (Feb. 26, 2017),

https://www.aei.org/society-and-culture/the-closing-of-the-military-mind/ [https://perma.cc
/QKV4-6FHH].
4. The President's Radio Address, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 94 (Jan. 19, 2002),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-2002-01-28/pdf/WCPD-2002-01-28-Pg94.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4RHG-U485].
5. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Action Network
Annual
Gala
(Apr.
6,
2011),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/04/06/remarks-president-national-action-network-annual-gala
[https://perma.cc
/UB37-G8MS]. "They" refers to the previous sentence in which President Obama discussed
"every one of our children."
6. President Donald Trump, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress, 2017 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. DCPD-201700150, at 6 (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/content
/pkg/DCPD-201700150/pdf/DCPD-201700150.pdf [https://perma.cc/LDB8-AFJ5].
7. See, e.g., Press Release, Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec'y Educ., U.S. Dep't of Educ.,
Statement by U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan on the 50th Anniversary of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (July 2, 2014), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/statement-ussecretary-education-arne-duncan-50th-anniversary-civil-rights-act-1964 [https://perma.cc
/85ET-V8WJ] ("Education is the civil rights issue of our time."); Trip Gabriel, Romney Calls
Education 'CivilRights Issue of Our Era ' and Urges Shift, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2012, at A23

("Mr. Romney said that the failure of so many American schools with minority students 'is
the civil rights issue of our era,' echoing a mantra of the school choice movement."); Senator
John McCain, Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
4, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2008/president/conventions/videos/transcripts/
20080904_MCCAINSPEECH.html [https://perma.cc/2J4S-86E4] ("[E]ducation is the civil
rights issue of this century.").
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An effective civil rights framework for education will become even more crucial
as the nation wrestles with the unprecedented educational impacts of the
coronavirus.8 As we saw in the aftermath of Katrina, poor communities and
communities of color often fare the worst when a crisis arises. 9 Our nation should
not be surprised when those leaders who failed to protect the rights of poor and
minority communities before this pandemic continue to do so in the face of this
global health crisis. The United States needs a robust and complementary array of
federal and state laws to protect education as a civil right to prevent widening the
existing opportunity and achievement gaps that hindered our education system before
this crisis.
Analyzing the potential for protecting education as a civil right also is particularly
timely because litigators have returned to federal courts in recent years to attempt to
convince them that the U.S. Constitution protects every child's right to education.1
As discussed in greater detail below, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
recently held that the children in Detroit public schools had been denied their
constitutional right to literacy in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment." Although an en banc court vacated the
ruling, the decision remains a roadmap for other federal courts if they decide to offer
constitutional protection to children provided low-quality educational opportunities
and outcomes.
Scholars have offered an array of proposals that would enhance civil rights
protections for education through law and policy reforms that would reduce
inequitable and unjustifiable disparities in educational opportunities, including the
ideas included in my new edited volume, A Federal Right to Education:
Fundamental Questionsfor Our Democracy." In making recommendations for how
law and policy could help to close educational opportunity and achievement gaps,
scholars typically recommend federal, state, or local law reforms. 13 With a few

8. See Kevin Huffman, Homeschooling During the Coronavirus Will Set Back a
Generation of Children, WASH. POST, (Mar. 27, 2020) https://www.washingtonpost.com

&

/outlook/coronavirus-homeschooling-will-hurt-students-badly/2020/03/27/f63 9882a-6f62llea-bl48-e4ce3fbd85b5_story.html [https://perma.cc/L9PR-YXWA]; Eric A. Hanushek

Ludger Woessmann, The Economic Impacts of Learning Losses, OECD (September 2020),

http://hanushek.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/The%20Economic%20lmpacts%
20of%20Learning%20Lossesfinal vl.pdf [https://perma.cc/HVD5-ZRSM].
9. See, e.g., Michael Kogut, Making the Case: Did the Government's Response to

HurricaneKatrina Violate the Equal Protection Clause?, 11 SCHOLAR 127, 144-46 (2009);
John K. Pierre & Gail S. Stephenson, After Katrina:A CriticalLook at FEMA's Failure to

Provide Housingfor Victims of NaturalDisasters, 68 LA. L. REV. 443, 446-48 (2008).
10.

Robinson, supra note 2, at 16-19.

11. Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2020), vacated 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir.
2020) (en banc). The Gary B. decision is discussed at greater length in Section II.A.2.
12. A FEDERAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY,
supra note 2.

13. For examples of scholars recommending federal reforms, please see Kimberly Jenkins
Robinson, The Casefor a Collaborative EnforcementModelfor a FederalRight to Education,

40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1653, 1715-26 (2007) (recommending a collaborative enforcement
model for a federal right to education created by Congress); Goodwin Liu, Education,
Equality, and NationalCitizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 335 (2006) (contending that Congress
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notable exceptions, far fewer scholars recommend how federal and state law might
work together to protect a right to education."
The essential work of proposing novel law and policy solutions for protecting
education as a civil right and closing opportunity and achievement gaps must
recognize that neither the federal, state, nor local governments can tackle these
herculean challenges alone, just as no single law, court decision, or even a
constitutional amendment will solve our nation's education ills. This dilemma arises
in part because our nation's approach to education federalism is likely to insist on
limits on the scope and reach of a federal right to education or other federal reforms.
I have repeatedly and strenuously contended that our nation needs to disrupt and
restructure our approach to education federalism by making the federal government
the final guarantor of equal access to an excellent education while also embracing a
more balanced partnership between the federal and state governments."
Nevertheless, it is important to analyze how our nation could and should move ahead
with protecting education as a civil right, even if only more modest shifts to education
federalism materialize.
Both the federal and state governments should develop and adopt the legal and
policy architecture that is necessary to protect education as a civil right through a
synergistic array of federal and state laws. This architecture must be intentionally
designed to embrace the strengths of each level of government while ensuring that
the full complement of laws provide much-needed protection of access to an

has a "legislative duty to ensure that all children have adequate educational opportunity for
equal citizenship"). For examples of scholars recommending state and local reforms, please
see Joshua E. Weishart, Aligning EducationRights andRemedies, 27 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y

346, 353 (2018) (proposing that state courts should review a legislative remedy to determine
if the remedy of the state right to education is designed to "ensure that the equity and adequacy
of educational opportunities maintain an upward, directly proportional relationship"); William
S. Koski, Bridging the Teacher Quality Gap: Notes from California on the Potential and
Pitfalls of LitigatingTeaching Quality, in THE ENDURING LEGACY OF RODRIGUEZ: CREATING
NEW PATHWAYS TO EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 143, 162-64 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.

& Kimberly Jenkins Robinson eds., 2015) (recommending local litigation to remedy gaps in
teacher quality because "the remedy must be as complex as the cause of the quality gap").
14. My scholarship proposes restructuring the partnership between the federal
government and states to ensure that all children receive equal access to an excellent education.
See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, DisruptingEducation Federalism, 92 WASH. UNIV. L. REv.

959, 1002-05 (2015). In addition, for example, Derek Black has recommended taking a
"middle road" to protect a federal right to education that relies on federal and state law by
deploying federal equal protection law to enforce state education rights. Derek
Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection: The First Step
Toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1343, 1343

(2010). Michael Rebell contends that the (now repealed) federal No Child Left Behind Act
implicitly created a "right to comprehensive educational opportunity," and he builds upon both
federal and state court decisions to support the recognition and enforcement of this right. See
Michael A. Rebell, The Right to Comprehensive Educational Opportunity, 47 HARv. C.R.-

C.L. L. REV. 47, 111 (2012).
15. See, e.g., Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, No Quick Fix for Equity and Excellence: The
Virtues of Incremental Shifts in Education Federalism, 27 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 201, 205
(2016); Robinson, supra note 14.
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excellent and equitable education for our nation's schoolchildren. I present my
argument for how to accomplish this in three parts. Part I lays the framework for the
legal architecture to protect education as a civil right by adopting a progressive and
capacious definition of a civil right. This Part also offers reasons that the United
States should adopt a civil rights framework for protecting children from harmful
disparities in educational opportunities. Part II shows how both federal and state law
fail to protect education as a civil right as it is defined in Part I. Part III contends that
federal and state law should work synergistically to protect education as a civil right
and then proposes law and policy reforms to accomplish this.
In proposing how federal and state law should synergistically protect education
as a civil right, I propose one of an array of options for accomplishing this goal. The
nature and scope of the necessary protections in state law are dependent on what
exists at the federal level and vice versa. I invite other scholars to continue this
dialogue about how federal and state reforms can and should work together to protect
education as a civil right.
I. WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PROTECT EDUCATION AS A CIVIL RIGHT
Although Brown v. Board of Education declared equal educational opportunity a
right well over half a century ago, 16 the longstanding educational opportunity and
achievement gaps along lines of race, class, and neighborhood reveal that federal law
and policy have failed to protect education as a civil right." Civil rights laws in the
United States provide one of the primary engines for expanding opportunities for
those who would otherwise lack a mechanism to demand equal treatment. In this
Part, I adopt a definition for a "civil right" and explain why protecting education as
a civil right provides an essential framework for education reform in the United
States.
A. Toward a More Capacious Understandingof Civil Rights
To understand how law and policy should protect education as a civil right, it is
important to adopt a definition of a civil right. Civil rights exist at the intersection of
two robust bodies of scholarship: rights scholarship and civil rights scholarship. Both
what constitutes a right and the nature of civil rights are deeply contested and has
evolved over time. After briefly acknowledging this scholarship as well as some of
the critiques of civil rights legislation below, I adopt an approach to civil rights that
guides the legal analysis and proposals in this Article.
Civil rights are merely one subcategory of legal rights. 18 Rights establish the
structure of our society because they set legal rules that govern relationships between

16. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
17. Robinson, supra note 2, at 3-7 (presenting data on educational opportunity gaps along
race, class, and neighborhood).
18. For those interested in a scholarly analysis of the different types of rights, please see,
for example, Waseem Ahmad Qureshi, Stemming the Bias of Civil and PoliticalRights Over
Economic, Social, and CulturalRights, 46 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 289, 292 (2018); David
Landau, The Reality of SocialRightsEnforcement, 53 HARV. INT'L L.J. 189, 193 (2012); Helen
Hershkoff, "Just Words": Common Law and the Enforcement of State ConstitutionalSocial
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the government, individuals, and groups.19 Rights language has been at the forefront
of efforts to reform education because, as education scholar Anne Newman astutely
explains, "[t]he moral heft of rights claims gives educators, parents, and politicians
a powerful vocabulary (or as philosopher Ronald Dworkin put it, 'political trumps')
with which to express their frustrations with and hopes for public schools." 20 Rights
discourse helps individuals to identify an injustice, explain how they should be
treated, and demand what they should be entitled to,21 which can lead individuals to
organize and mobilize for political engagement that seeks reform. 22 Rights can act as
a constraint on the decisions and actions of a democratic majority in order to advance
justice, 23 including through their judicial enforcement.24 Comprehensive reform
frequently relies upon a rights discourse because rights, particularly at the federal
level, can express a national priority.25
What constitutes a "civil righf' has changed throughout our nation's history and
remains contested. 26 Today, many equate "civil rights" with "rights against
discrimination. 27 Thus, many understand civil rights to provide a body of law that

and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1533-34 (2010); Mark Tushnet, Civil Rights
and Social Rights: The Future ofthe Reconstruction Amendments, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1207,

1211 (1992).
19.

Martha Minow, InterpretingRights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860,

1866 (1987).
20.

ANNE NEWMAN, REALIZING EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS: ADVANCING SCHOOL REFORM

THROUGH COURTS AND COMMUNITIES
SERIOUSLY,
21.

1

(2013)

(quoting

RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS

at xi (1977)).

MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF

LEGAL MOBILIZATION 88 (1994); Minow, supra note 19, at 1867.
22.

STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY AND

POLITICAL CHANGE 131 (2d ed. 2004); MCCANN, supra note 21, at 11; William E. Forbath,
Why Is This Rights Talk Different from Every Other Rights Talk? Demoting the Court and
Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771, 1805 (1994) ("People mobilize around

rights, not human capital policy. Every previous generation of reformers addressed its task in
the language of citizenship and rights, as well as of budgets and policies. We have learned to
be leery of high-sounding rights talk; we have not learned to do without it.").
23. NEWMAN, supra note 20, at 9; STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF
RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES 104-05 (1999) ("'Rights talk' is essential because
it raises the threshold of justification for interfering with interests deemed especially
important.").
24. See ROBIN L. WEST, REIMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF
FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 71-72 (2003); Frank B. Cross, The Error
ofPositiveRights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 860 (2001).
25. Rebell, supra note 14, at 52.

26.

Risa L. Goluboff, The ThirteenthAmendment and the Lost Origins of CivilRights, 50

DUKE L.J. 1609, 1611-12 (2001) (explaining that during World War II and subsequent years
"'civil rights' did not refer to a unified, coherent category; the content of the term was open,
changing, and contradictory, carrying resonances of the past as well as of several possible
contending futures"); Mark Tushnet, supra note 18, at 1207, 1209-10 ("In the past century,

the definition of civil rights has continued to change.").
27.

ROBIN L. WEST, CIVIL RIGHTS: RETHINKING THEIR NATURAL FOUNDATION

13

(2019).

For a discussion of affirmative action and civil rights, please see RANDALL KENNEDY, FOR
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protects against discrimination based on prohibited reasons such as race, religion,
sex, sexual orientation, and disability. 28 This modern understanding of civil rights
represents a shift in thinking from the Reconstruction era understanding of civil
rights, which was disputed and fluid. 29
Despite their contested nature, civil rights provide an essential foundation for
civilized society. 30 Civil rights law provides a "moral lodestar" that establishes a
vision for pursuing equal opportunity. 31 The progress that enforcement of civil rights
laws has accomplished is undeniable. 32 Prohibiting discrimination, such as the public
segregation of schoolchildren in separate schools, 33 was an important first step on the
long road toward beginning to dismantle the segregation and inequality sanctioned
by Jim Crow. 34 Establishing a civil right requires more than a mere declaration of the
right, even if it is one that is included in the U.S. Constitution. The legislative,
executive, and judicial branches must articulate and enforce civil rights for them to
be realized.3 5
Despite the undeniable power of civil rights in the United States, many scholars
also have criticized civil rights laws and noted how they repeatedly fall short of their
goals. Although a thorough canvassing of this scholarship would take several
volumes, it is important to acknowledge a few examples from this body of
scholarship to explain why a more capacious understanding of civil rights beyond
nondiscrimination is adopted in this Article. For instance, scholars criticize the
limited reach of civil rights laws. As Risa Goluboff's work explains, the approach to
civil rights that first sought to end segregated schools set aside other harms that Jim
Crow inflicted. The U.S. Supreme Court embraced the NAACP lawyers' emphasis
on stigmatic harm, and, in so doing, "the Court set to one side the continuing material

DISCRIMINATION: RACE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND THE LAW 33-39 (First Vintage Books ed.

2015).
28. "The essence of modern civil rights law is that individuals have an entitlement not to
be discriminated against for certain forbidden reasons, such as race, sex, religion, etc." Richard
Thompson Ford, Rethinking Rights After the Second Reconstruction, 123 YALE L.J. 2942,

2950 (2014). These protections have been expanded in some arenas to disability and sexual
orientation, particularly in employment. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020)
(holding that Title VII prohibits firing an employee for being gay or transgender); Jack M.
Beermann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, Fifty Years Later, 34 CONN. L.
REV. 981, 1021-22 (2002) (noting the expansion of antidiscrimination law to cover disability
discrimination in employment).
29. RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 154-56 (1999); Tushnet,
supra note 18, at 1207; Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation

Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1024-25, 1027 (1995).
30. See Tushnet, supra note 18, at 1208 (" [C]ivil rights are absolute and must be provided
in any civilized society .... ").
31. WEST, supra note 27, at 1.
32. Id. at 1-2.

33. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
34.

RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 247 (2007).

35.

ALEXANDER TSESIS, WE SHALL OVERCOME: A HISTORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE

LAw 3, 5 (2008); Kathryn Abrams, Performative Citizenship in the Civil Rights and Immigrant
Rights Movements, in A NATION OF WIDENING OPPORTUNITIES: THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT 50,

at 1, 14 (Ellen D. Katz & Samuel R. Bagenstos eds., 2015); Tushnet, supra note 18, at 1214.
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inequalities in the segregated school systems under attack." 36 The emphasis of civil
rights lawyers on overturning Plessy v. Ferguson also led the Court to focus on the
public aspects of Jim Crow while neglecting to dismantle its private aspects. 37
Similarly, Derrick Bell highlights the limited reach of the civil rights protections in
the Brown v. Board of Education decision in noting that "[t]he decision in Brown
was far more successful in recognizing racial injustices than it was in providing
meaningful remedies." 38 Bell laments the ineffectiveness of Brown by stating that
"the Brown decision in 1954 is the twentieth century equivalent of the Emancipation
Proclamation in the nineteenth. Both had symbolic value for black people, promising
racial justice; and neither provided substantive government enforcement to eliminate
the oppression blacks suffered-first from abject slavery and then from racial
segregation." 39
Scholars also note an array of other criticisms of civil rights legislation. For
example, some contend that civil rights laws too often narrowly focus on intentional
and explicit discrimination while they fail to remedy systemic inequalities." Richard
Thompson Ford has critiqued how the Civil Rights Act of 1964 effectively addressed
overt discrimination while simultaneously leaving an array of institutionalized
injustices untouched even though these injustices serve as the primary source of
racial harms today." Others criticize the antidiscrimination principle at the heart of
civil rights laws for failing to address substantive inequality. 2 Some criticize U.S.
civil rights laws for their integrationist focus because this focus can emphasize
assimilation and the subsequent erasure of the rich diversity of minority

36. GOLUBOFF, supra note 34, at 244.
37. Id. at 245.
38. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education, 49
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1053, 1065 (2005).
39. Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education: Reliving and Learningfrom Our Racial
History, 66 UNIV. PITT. L. REV. 21, 22 (2004).

40. Mark Dorosin, A Civil RightsActfor the 21st Century: The Privilegesand Immunities
Clause and a Constitutional Guarantee to Be Free from DiscriminatoryImpact, 6 WAKE
FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 35, 36 (2016); Kimani Paul-Emile, Blackness as Disability?, 106 GEO.
L.J. 293, 296 (2018).

41. Ford, supra note 28, at 2944 ("Rights can offer limited improvements in a narrow set
of circumstances, but the effectiveness of the civil rights approach diminishes and its costs
increase as they are applied to more novel, complex, and elusive social problems.").
42. See, e.g., Kate Sablosky Elengold, Consumer Remedies for Civil Rights, 99 B.U. L.
REV. 587, 591 (2019) (arguing "the history of civil rights advocacy and the failure of the
antidiscrimination doctrine to achieve group-based equality goals counsels toward enlarging
the legal mechanisms for achieving civil rights remedies"); Olatunde C. A. Johnson, Equality
Law Pluralism, 117 COLUM. L. REv. 1973, 1987 (2017) ("[I]t is not hard to discern a mismatch
between antidiscrimination law and the complex problems of exclusion today. . . . The
mismatch occurs because antidiscrimination frameworks often assume a type of formal
equality among individuals or groups."); Gloria Ladson-Billings & William F. Tate
IV, Toward a CriticalRace Theory of Education, 97 TCHR. COLL. REC. 47 (1995), reprinted
in CRITICAL RACE THEORY IN EDUCATION: ALL GOD'S CHILDREN GOT A SONG 11, 16 (Adrienne
D. Dixson, Celia K. Rousseau Anderson & Jamel K. Donner eds., 2d ed. 2017) ("Traditional
civil rights approaches to solving inequality have depended on the 'rightness' of democracy
while ignoring the structural inequality of capitalism.").
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communities. 3 Others contend that civil rights law can be counterproductive.4 4 Still
others contend that we should move away from a civil rights approach that focuses
on individual characteristics such as race and sex, and instead focus on a nonidentitarian approach.4 5 These scholarly critiques offer a few examples of how civil
rights legislation has fallen far short of the true equality that lies at its core.
The totality of these and other critiques suggest that the United States should
reimagine and restructure civil rights and civil rights legislation in ways that would
enable them to achieve greater equality of opportunity. Scholars have offered a
variety of more capacious and nuanced understandings of civil rights.4 6 For this

43. See, e.g., Michelle Adams, RadicalIntegration,94 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 263-64 (2006)

(noting that "the present-day integrationist vision also oversimplifies the emotional discomfort
and identity sacrifice that are associated with integration"); Raymond Cross, Reconsidering
the OriginalFoundingof ndian and Non-IndianAmerica: Why a Second American Founding
Based on Principlesof Deep DiversityIs Needed, 25 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REv. 61, 80 (2004)

("It's not surprising, therefore, that by the early 1980s, the grand era of civil rights and Great
Society reforms came to a screeching halt. While some political pundits attribute this outcome
to a sea change in the American peoples' attitude towards 'big government' and 'big social
welfare programs,' I believe these initiatives failed primarily because the Indian peoples, and
other ethnic and cultural minorities, did not want to be 'integrated' into American civic life in
the manner demanded by these initiatives."); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and
United States v. Fordice: Why Integrationism FailsAfrican-Americans Again, 81 CALIF. L.
REv. 1401, 1431-32 (1993) ("Integration, as developed in Brown and reiterated in Fordice,
fails to respect both the African-American community as a distinct cultural community and
the concomitant claims made by individual African-Americans to protect that unique
community.").
44. See, e.g., RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RIGHTS GONE WRONG: HOw LAW CORRUPTS THE
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 19 (2011) ("At their best, civil rights help bring people together as

equals, in common projects and shared institutions. At worst, civil rights can hinder or
undermine sound policy, fracture society into mutually antagonistic tribes, and encourage
selfish and irresponsible individualism. They can even begin to undermine the egalitarian
efforts they were designed to further."); John

O.

Calmore, Random Notes of an Integration

Warrior, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1441, 1449-50 (1997) (identifying four shortcomings of
integration, including "worst of all, its unintended consequence is to support and reinforce
white dominance and hegemony").
45. See, e.g., Katie R. Eyer, That's Not Discrimination:American Beliefs and the Limits
ofAnti-DiscriminationLaw, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1360-61 (2012) (arguing there is a "need

to look beyond traditional discrimination claims when seeking to protect the interests of
putative victims of discrimination" and "extra-discrimination remedies (i.e., remedies that do
not focus on group-based discrimination claims) provides one such alternate approach");
Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J.

251, 256 (2010) (proposing reframing laws that aim to advance equality of opportunity around
the common human condition ofvulnerability in ways that would obligate the state to maintain
equality between individuals by taking on a comprehensive societal obligation that ensures
that the institutions that distribute such benefits as employment, health, and wealth do so in a
way that does not systematically disadvantage some while privileging others).
46. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Crossroadsand Blind Alleys: A CriticalExamination of
Recent Writing About Race, 82 TEx. L. REv. 121, 151 (2003) ("Critical race theorists should

also examine the relationship between class and race more carefully than they have done. Is
the significance of race really declining, and, if so, are poverty and the income gap the new
civil rights issues of the millennium?") (reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW
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Article, I embrace Robin West's recent compelling and comprehensive approach to
civil rights. Her approach is particularly compelling because it addresses the lack of
a jurisprudential approach to civil rights beyond nondiscrimination and the neglect
of an understanding of the foundational rights that nondiscrimination laws aimed to
protect. 4
West explains how civil rights relate to law but are not synonymous with it. She
distinguishes civil rights and law in stating that:
Civil rights, classically understood, originate in natural rights that reflect
various human needs, and depend upon the presence of law - of ordinary
positive law - for their realization. They then entitle the right-holder to
that requisite body of law. They are rights to law, because they rest on
an acknowledgment of the necessity of law to our capacity to flourish in
society.4 8
West's approach rejects the longstanding emphasis on negative rights.4 9 Instead,
her embrace of this broader definition moves civil rights from the narrow realm of
protecting against particular types of harms to the broader realm of an entitlement to
particular benefits. She views civil rights as "quintessential positive rights to bodies
of law that protect those aspects of our natural capabilities most conducive to social
participation and well-being." 50 Civil rights so conceived can encourage the well-

CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela P. Harris eds.,
2002); DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE

UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 200 (2004) (contending that civil rights advocates

can build a strategy that acknowledges that racial progress is limited to those instances when
the needs of blacks and the nation converged through, among other things, blacks individually
and collectively challenging "the assumptions of white dominance and the presumptions of
black incompetence and inferiority" and potentially relying less on the courts); Athena D.
Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of CriticalRace Theory and Related

Scholarship, 84 DENy. UNIV. L. REV. 329, 378 (2006) (noting that some critical race theory
"scholars . . have called for analyses of the class system in U.S. society and the way in which
race, gender, and other forms of oppression mutually construct and are constructed by it");
Cass R. Sunstein, Three CivilRights Fallacies,79 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 751-52, 773-74 (1991)
(showing how three central claims of civil rights-prejudice and irrationality cause
discrimination, civil rights law should be compensatory, and courts and constitutional
adjudication should guide the administration of civil rights law-are fallacies and proposing
that "civil rights law should be informed by a principle that forbids morally irrelevant
differences from being turned, without very good reason, into a systemic source of social or
legal disadvantages. Thus understood, the antidiscrimination principle becomes an anti-caste
principle. . . . [S]uch a principle provides a better foundation for civil rights policy than the
three fallacies that have burdened the law for so long.").
47. Robin L. West, Toward a Jurisprudence of the Civil Rights Acts, in A NATION OF
WIDENING OPPORTUNITIES: THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT 50, supra note 35, at 70, 71-72.

48. WEST, supra note 27, at 216-17.
49. Id. at 217; see also Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions,
59 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 519, 525 (1992) ("The American Bill of Rights is frequently described
as a charter of 'negative' liberties, protecting certain areas of individual freedom from state

interference.").
50.

WEST, supra note 27, at 217.
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being of individuals by promoting participation in civil society.>
West challenges us to engage in a new civil rights revolution. She encourages us
to create a body of law that develops and protects civil rights that are acknowledged
but not fully protected as well as to ignite our imaginations and ambitions to create
civil rights that are only weakly perceived or expressed.52 She explains that this civil
rights revolution "must reengage its origin in a sense of legal aspiration and legal
ambition. Our civil rights once expressed our ambitions, collectively, for good law,
not only for constitutional constraints on bad law."5 3 This Article takes up this
challenge within the realm of education.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected invitations to recognize positive
constitutional welfare rights,'5 those seeking to remedy the shortcomings of existing
civil rights law need not import the Court's narrow approach to constitutional rights
into civil rights law. Scholars have explained why the distinction between positive
and negative rights is illusory and ill conceived.55 For example, Cass Sunstein and
Stephen Holmes contend that "all legally enforced rights are necessarily positive
rights." 5 6 Enforcing rights requires the active involvement of government machinery,
and, thus, even those rights labeled as negative rights are in reality benefits provided
by the state.5" Furthermore, as California Supreme Court Justice Goodwin Liu has
noted, positive rights inform the central ideals of transformative legal moments in
the United States, including the ideology that informed both the emancipation of
slaves and Reconstruction5 8 as well as the constitutional understanding of the New
Deal and the Second Bill of Rights proposed by President Franklin Roosevelt. 59
Furthermore, embracing positive rights as within the body of civil rights builds
upon the inclusion of positive rights in state constitutions. Indeed, "[u]nlike the
Federal Constitution, which consistently has been interpreted as excluding
affirmative claims to government assistance, every state constitution in the United

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 259 (emphasis in original).
Hershkoff, supra note 18, at 1533-34; Glendon, supra note 49.

55.

See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REv.

2271, 2282 (1990) ("Even those constitutional duties which are most clearly phrased in the
negative may be enforceable only through affirmative governmental exertions. The [F]irst
[A]mendment exhorts only that 'Congress shall make no law,' but it has been obvious for
some time that the mere failure to pass laws restricting speech will not relieve government of
its responsibility for protecting the freedom of speech."); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational
Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1293,

1326 (1984) ("In a positive state, all rights are to some extent positive, for the government is
often in a position to deal mortal blows to the exercise of rights by simply ceasing to intervene.
If we are to distinguish sensibly among allocations that result in impacts on the exercise of
constitutional rights, the mere invocation of a line between positive and negative rights will
not do the job.").
56. HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 23, at 43.
57. Id. at 45-46.
58.

Liu, supra note 13, at 336-37.
Id.; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 61-95 (2004); William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and
Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 68-75 (1999).
59.
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States-like many constitutions abroad-contains some explicit commitment to
positive rights." 60 Therefore, I include a positive civil right to education within the
realm of civil rights that federal and state law should protect.
The next subpart examines why the United States should protect education as a

civil right.
B. Why Should We ProtectEducation as a Civil Right?
As the need for education reform in the United States continues to grow-a need
that is further exacerbated by the global health pandemic-advocates frequently
employ the language of rights. 61 A discourse of rights for education provides a
vehicle for creating an excellent education system and well-prepared citizens. 62 A
rights discourse can shape the complex systems that constitute education, which is a
product of "law, bureaucracy, deliberation, compromise, and pedagogy." 6 3
Reforming law and policy to protect education as a civil right would surround
education with the legal protections that are needed to protect its ability to serve as
the engine of democracy and opportunity at the heart of our nation. Education has
long served as "the most important function of state and local governments," as the
Court recognized in Brown v. Board of Education.64 State governments allocate the
most funds to public education among social welfare programs. 65 Public education
also engages more people than other social welfare programs. 66 Education serves as
a precondition for a wide array of human functions and is a necessary foundation for
functioning in an ordered society.
Guaranteeing and protecting a civil right to education would empower our nation
to create the educated citizens that our democracy needs to thrive. 67 The caliber of a
child's education shapes their ability to engage effectively in public discourse. 68
Therefore, each child must receive an education that empowers her or him to engage
as equals in collective, deliberative decisions, 69 be they at the local, state, or federal
level. This includes the ability to analyze complex issues through critical and
reflective analysis and to express her or his viewpoints in a clear, reasoned manner. 0
As education scholar Anne Newman has astutely explained, "[d]emocratic

60. Hershkoff, supra note 18, at 1523.
61.

NEWMAN, supra note 20.

62. Id. at 6.
63.

West, supra note 47, at 95.

64. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
65. State and Local Fin. Initiative, State and Local Expenditures, URB. INST.,

https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-local-financeinitiative/state-and-local-backgrounders/state-and-local-expenditures [https://perma.cc/8W8J
-QVA5].
66.

JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD

& NATHAN

SCOVRONICK, THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE

PUBLIC SCHOOLS 9 (2003).
67.

See MICHAEL A. REBELL, FLUNKING DEMOCRACY: SCHOOLS, COURTS, AND CIVIC

PARTICIPATION 98-123 (2018).

68. NEWMAN, supra note 20, at 18.
69. Id. at 10.
70. Id. at 35-42.
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institutions clearly cannot thrive unless citizens receive an education tailored to the
demands of citizenship. These demands involve unavoidably high standards whose
realization should not be left to the sway of majoritarian politics, and thus justify the
use of rights claims in the education arena." 1 Those denied an adequate and
equitable education too often lack the political agency and influence to protect their
interests.72
A well-educated citizenry has always served as the foundation of our
democracy. 3 Both the founders of our nation and those who engineered common
schools possessed a deep commitment to educating students to become effective
citizens for a democratic nation.7 4 Some New England states expressed this
commitment as early as following the Revolutionary War as these states drafted state
constitutions to guarantee education, while most states confirmed this commitment
by adopting such guarantees during the common schools movement of the nineteenth
century.7 5 In addition, when Congress was readmitting southern states into the Union
it both explicitly and implicitly conditioned this readmission on the states
guaranteeing education, as the scholarship of Derek Black confirms.7 6 Education
provided the vehicle for creating the educated citizenry that was essential to the
republican form of government that Article IV, section 4 of the Constitution required
the United States to guarantee. 7
The United States' tolerance of substantial and enduring educational opportunity
and achievement gaps in turn neglects the very foundation of our democracy.
Educators and policymakers have deemphasized civics and social studies while they
focused on math and reading. 78 Students of color and low-income students have been
hanned the most by this approach as research confirms that they lag behind their
white peers in civic skills and knowledge. 79
Protecting education as a civil right also would help to ensure that each child
receives the education needed to prepare her or him to be a productive member of
our economy. 80 Children are the workforce of the not-too-distant future. Workers in
the United States need the array of analytical, literacy, and problem-solving skills
that the economy needs as it moves away from low-skilled labor to a knowledge

economy. 81

71. Id. at 18.
72. Id. at 15-19.
73. See REBELL, supra note 67, at 4-5.

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Compromise to Guarantee Education, 70

STAN. L. REV. 735, 779-81 (2018).
77. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see also Black, supra note 76, at 781.
78. REBELL, supra note 67, at 2.
79. Id. at 3.
80. See THE EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 12-15; Robinson,
&

supra note 3, at 327-28, 332.
81. See Phillip Brown & Ewart Keep, Rethinking the Race Between Education
Technology, 35 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 31, 34, 39 (2018); Michael A. Peters & Walter Humes,
Education in the Knowledge Economy, 1 POL'Y FUTURES EDUC. 1, 2 (2003); Walter W. Powell
& Kaisa Snellman, The Knowledge Economy, 30 ANN. REV. SOC. 199, 212-13 (2004).
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Education is essential to providing these skills.8 2 The United States also needs an
educated workforce to remain competitive in the global economy and educational
inequalities impede the nation's ability to compete effectively. 83 Indeed, the costs of
opportunity and achievement gaps is growing as the nation's public schoolchildren
became majority minority in 2014:84
The opportunity costs of not closing achievement and graduation gaps
will continue to grow as global market integration continues apace.
Rising to this monumental challenge requires a highly skilled labor force.
The window of opportunity to harness the demographic dividend is
closing, but unlike developing countries with high youth dependency
rates, the United States has the economic resources to make the necessary
investments. Whether it has sufficient political will is the real question.8 5
Opportunity and achievement gaps also deprive many children of the ability to reach
their highest earning potential, which is not only a loss to the child, their families,
and their communities, but also deprives local, state, and federal governments of the
taxes that they could collect. 86
Therefore, the United States should develop the legal architecture it needs to
protect education as a civil right. The next Part explains how current federal and state
law fail to protect education as a civil right.
II.

NEITHER FEDERAL NOR STATE LAW ADEQUATELY PROTECTS EDUCATION AS A

CIVIL RIGHT
Scholars debate whether education is currently a civil right. Some scholars have
marshalled historical support to show that education already exists as a civil right in
the United States. For instance, California Supreme Court Justice Goodwin Liu
recounts how congressmen during the 1870s and 1880s relied upon education as a
civil right as the foundation for proposing federal legislation directing federal aid to
public schools.8 7 Although these bills proved unsuccessful, Justice Liu's work

82.

Jason Nance, The Justifications for a Stronger Federal Response to Address

EducationalInequalities,in A FEDERAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION:

FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR

OUR DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 35, 39.

83. Id.
84.

THE

JOEL MCFARLAND ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS,

CONDITION OF EDUCATION

2017,

at

102

(2017),

U.S.

DEP'T OF EDUC.,

https://nces.ed.gov/pubs20l7

/ 2 0 171 44 .pdf [https://perma.cc/F4VU-A65F].
85. Marta Tienda & Sigal Alon, Diversity and the Demographic Dividend: Achieving
EducationalEquity in an Aging White Society, in THE PRICE WE PAY 48, 70-71 (Clive R.

Belfield & Henry M. Levin eds., 2007) (quoted in Nance, supra note 82, at 39).
86.

See Nance, supra note 82, at 39-40.

87. Liu, supra note 13, at 375, 379-95. For example, Representative George Hoar of
Massachusetts in 1870 introduced in Congress a bill that relied upon education as a civil right
as "[a] mong the fundamental civil rights of the citizen" that required the federal government
to oversee public education in a way that would focus on education in the South. See id. at
380.
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reminds us that as the nation constructed its framework for equality and citizenship,
many understood education as an essential foundation of this framework.
Similarly, Michael McConnell contends that education was recognized as a civil
right by the beginning of the nineteenth century in stating that:
By the turn of the century-and certainly by the time of the Brown
decision in 1954-there could be little doubt that schools satisfied the
criteria even the opponents of the 1875 Act understood for the existence
of civil rights. The right to education had become stable, uniform, and
legally enforceable. 88
In contrast, John Eastman's review of the historical support of education as a civil
right acknowledges that many states protected education as a civil right when they
drafted or revised state constitutions in our nation's early history, but education was
not a civil right by the end of the nineteenth century because a state could decline to
provide it.89
Robin West applies her definition of a civil right to education and offers a threepart analysis to explain why education is a civil right. First, education provides a
means to accomplish the natural right to human flourishing. 90 Second, education
along with employment provide the building blocks of our civil society because
"employment and education are clearly as vital to civil participation in this century
as contract and property was in the nineteenth." 91 Third, education cannot be
acquired alone and needs a robust body of law to make it attainable. 92 West also
contends that our current federal civil rights laws fail to protect education as a civil
right because we have collapsed civil rights into the antidiscrimination principle,
rather than protected the underlying substantive right to education itself. 9 She notes
that the focus on formal equality has eclipsed the tradition of enacting positive laws
to protect substantive civil rights.94
Although I agree with West that federal law does not protect a civil right to
education, in this Part I go even further than West in explaining why both federal and
state law and policy do not protect education as a civil right. First, current federal
law does not provide a complete array of antidiscrimination protections for
education. As a result, education is not protected as a civil right even under the
narrower definition of a civil right to nondiscrimination in education. Federal law
also does not protect the broader definition of a civil right that would protect
education's ability to promote human flourishing because it does not provide a
substantive right to education. Second, state nondiscrimination protections are
inadequate to prevent discrimination in education. Furthermore, the state protections
to a substantive right to education vary so widely in strength and enforceability that

88.
89.

McConnell, supra note 29, at 1104.
John C. Eastman, When Did EducationBecome a Civil Right? An Assessment of State
ConstitutionalProvisionsfor Education 1776-1990, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 34 (1998).
90. WEST, supra note 27, at 208.
91. Id. at 208-09, 211.

92. Id. at 208.
93. Id. at 210.
94. Id. at210-11.
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they leave educational opportunity to the chance of state residence and zip codes in
ways that undermine education as a civil right. Therefore, even if U.S. history reveals
that many have viewed education as a civil right, neither federal nor state law protects
education as a civil right.
A. FederalLaw Does Not ProtectEducation as a CivilRight
Federal law does not adequately protect education as a civil right under either a
narrow antidiscrimination view of civil rights or a more capacious understanding of
civil rights as positive, substantive rights to enable human flourishing. In addition,
federal enforcement of the existing nondiscrimination laws is hampered by limited
resources and staffing. As a result, federal law and policy do not protect education
as a civil right.
1. The Incomplete and Ineffective Federal Antidiscrimination Protections for
Education
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color,
or national origin in any program or activity that receives federal financial
assistance. 95 This prohibition has served as a powerful tool to challenge intentional
discrimination in public schools. 96 For instance, the Civil Rights Act, including Title
IV's authorization of desegregation lawsuits by the Attorney General, 97 provided the
catalyst for school desegregation while the U.S. Supreme Court dragged its feet on
setting a clear and enforceable standard for desegregation after Brown v. Board of
Education (Brown II).98
Nevertheless, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act no longer provides an effective
vehicle to combat either intentional or disparate impact discrimination. The Supreme
Court interpreted the core prohibition in section 601 of Title VI to prohibit only
99
intentional discrimination in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.
Although overt and intentional discrimination was commonplace throughout this
nation's history, far fewer facially discriminatory policies exist today, largely due to
the influence of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.10
Schoolchildren face several challenges to prove intentional discrimination

95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
96.

See 34 C.F.R. pt. 100 (2019); JARED P. COLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45665, CIVIL

1964, at
1, 5, 23 (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45665 [https://penna.cc
/2DLD-WZBG].
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6.
98. 349 U.S. 294 (1954); Robinson, supra note 1, at 802-04 (describing how the Court
permitted school districts to delay and evade school desegregation, including its failure to
clarify the nature and scope of the obligation to desegregate); Chinh Q. Le, RaciallyIntegrated
RIGHTS AT SCHOOL: AGENCY ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF

Education and the Role of the Federal Government, 88 N.C. L. REV. 725, 735-36 (2010)

(explaining how the Civil Rights Act of 1964 functioned to combat school desegregation).
99. 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978).
100. COLE, supra note 96, at 6; see 34 C.F.R. pt. 100 (2019).
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occurred in their school. 1 The intentional discrimination requirement places a very
heavy, sometimes impossible, burden on the plaintiff who has suffered harm.102 The
Court has noted that intentional discrimination is not established when the defendant
is merely aware of the negative racial consequences of her or his actions. Instead, a
plaintiff must prove that the defendant "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon
an identifiable group."" 3
Today, most actors in public schools no longer openly admit their discriminatory
aims.14 In addition, a government actor may not be aware of his or her biased or
racist motivations even though bias or racism are driving the actor's behavior. As
Charles Lawrence has persuasively explained, unconscious thought drives much of
modern-day racism. 115 Building on the work of Freud, Lawrence elucidates how the
mind often excludes racism from consciousness because society has condemned
racism. The mind seeks to avoid ideas that it understands to conflict with societal
understandings of what is good and right. 106 Drawing upon the research of cognitive
psychology, Lawrence illuminates the ways in which culture transmits an
understanding of the world around us that may be implicit and tacit and thus does not
rise to the level of consciousness. As a result, a requirement to show intent to prove
racial discrimination "ignores much of what we understand about how the human
mind works."107
Despite the lack of consciousness of racism, even as this current moment of racial
awakening is raising awareness of the enduring nature of racism and its influence,108
the racism of today operates as a system just as the racism of Jim Crow operated as

101. Russell J. Skiba, Suzanne E. Eckes & Kevin Brown, African American
Disproportionality in School Discipline: The Divide Between Best Evidence and Legal

Remedy, 54 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 1071, 1091 (2009/10).
102.

Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with

Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319 (1987).
103. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). The Court's embrace of
deliberate indifference to discrimination as sufficient to support a Title VI claim provides a
limited exception to this requirement. Derek W. Black, The Mysteriously ReappearingCause
ofAction: The Court'sExpanded Concept of Intentional Gender and Race Discrimination in
FederallyFundedPrograms,67 MD. L. REv. 358, 381-82 (2008).

104. See Ian Haney-L6pez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1779, 1783 (2012);
Le, supra note 98, at 782.

105. Lawrence III, supra note 102, at 322.
106.

See id. at 322-23.

107. Id. at 323.
108. Kimberly J. Robinson, Understanding Our Common Interests in Educational
Excellence
and
Equity,
HARV.
L.
REv.
BLOG
(Sept.
9,
2020),

https://blog. harvardlawreview. org/understanding-our-common-interests-in-educationalexcellence-and-equity/ [https://perma.cc/M5GD-8H3 S] ("Our current moment of awakening
to racial injustice and the need for law and policy reform also builds on the understanding that
injustice against our neighbor harms each of us. Even if we are not the one beaten or killed
unjustly. recent protests giv c voice to the fact that w hen we turn a blind cy c to the ev il in our
midst. that ev il thrives and tears apart our communitics.").

20 LEGAL ARCHITECTURE_ TO PROTECT EDUCA TION

2020]

69

a system. 109 "The main difference between the two systems is that today's racism
inflicts a greater proportion of its harms unthinkingly."" Without a "smoking gun"
that shows intent to discriminate, plaintiffs can find it challenging to meet the burden
of proof for intent." Defendants also can easily hide discriminatory animus.1 1 2
Furthermore, "because behavior results from the interaction of a multitude of
motives, governmental officials will always be able to argue that racially neutral
considerations prompted their actions." 11 3 Most importantly, the harm of
discrimination persists regardless of the motive of the government actor." 4
Therefore, the limitation of Title VI to a prohibition of intentional discrimination
does not provide effective protection-even against intentional discrimination.
Given the great difficulty of proving intentional discrimination and the decrease
in overt discrimination, a claim for disparate impact discrimination provides the only
potential avenue for those injured by discrimination to find relief from an array of
harmful educational practices. Lawmakers enabled federal agencies to carry out the
prohibition of race, color, and national origin discrimination in section 601 of the
Civil Rights Act by passing section 602 of the Act. Section 602 authorizes agencies
by issuing rules, regulations, or
"to effectuate the provisions of [section 601] ...
orders of general applicability."" 5 The Department of Education, along with other
agencies, used this authority to promulgate a regulation that prohibits disparate
impact discrimination in education.116 Disparate impact claims provide a potential
remedy for a wide range of educational practices, including school funding,
disciplinary measures, tracking, and the overrepresentation of minorities in special
education." However, the Court held in Alexander v. Sandoval that only federal
agencies can enforce regulations promulgated under section 602.118
Some plaintiffs have attempted to circumvent Sandoval by trying to enforce the
disparate impact regulations through § 1983,119 which provides plaintiffs a cause of
action for a violation of federal right under color of state law. 120 The Supreme Court
has not yet ruled on whether plaintiffs may use § 1983 to enforce disparate impact
regulations. The courts of appeals are split on whether § 1983 may be used for this

109. Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal
Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1, 51 (1977).

Citizenship

Under

the

Fourteenth

110. Id.
111.

M. Braxton Marcela, From Injustice at School to Justice in Court: Seeking Litigation

Approaches to ChallengeRacial Disparitiesin School Discipline, 17
92 (2017).
112. Lawrence III, supra note 102, at 319.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 42 U.S.C. §§2000d, 2000d-1.
116. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2019); COLE, supra note 96, at 11.

CONN. PUB. INT.

L.J. 87,

117. Daniel J. Losen, ChallengingRacial Disparities:The Promise andPitfalls of the No
ChildLeft BehindAct'sRace-ConsciousAccountability,47 How. L.J. 243, 283 (2004).

118. See 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
119. See, e.g., Lucero v. Detroit Pub. Sch., 160 F. Supp. 2d 767, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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purpose. The Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have rejected such claims.12 1
The Tenth Circuit is the only circuit that has allowed such claims after Sandoval.12 2
Sandoval itself explains why the Court is likely to reject the enforcement of
disparate impact claims through § 1983. Sandoval reaffirmed that Title VI only
prohibits intentional discrimination. 12 3 The Court further made clear that the
disparate impact regulation exceeded the scope of section 601 in stating that:
Far from displaying congressional intent to create new rights, section 602
limits agencies to "effectuat[ing]" rights already created by section 601.
And the focus of section 602 is twice removed from the individuals who
will ultimately benefit from Title VI's protection. Statutes that focus on
the person regulated rather than the individuals protected create "no
implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular class of
persons." 124
Furthermore, the Sandoval Court openly questioned the viability of the disparate
impact claims in dicta. 125 Given that the Court did not permit direct enforcement of
section 602 because agency regulations should only effectuate the intentional
discrimination prohibition in section 601, it seems highly unlikely that the Court will
allow plaintiffs to extend the reach of section 601 to disparate impact discrimination
through § 1983.
The analysis in Sandoval also explains why the Court is likely to apply the
Blessing v. Freestone test for determining if a right can be enforced under § 1983 in
a way that rejects a private cause of action for the Title VI disparate impact
regulations. 12 6 Blessing considers if an enforceable right exists by examining if
Congress intended for the plaintiff to be the beneficiary, the right must be sufficiently
clear that its enforcement will not strain judicial competence, and the statute must
impose a mandatory obligation on the states. 127 The Court in Gonzaga University v.
Doe emphasized that Congress must have intended to create a federal right rather
than merely show that the plaintiff is the intended beneficiary. 128 As the language
quoted above demonstrates, the Sandoval Court did not view section 602 as creating
a right. It also viewed section 602 as focusing on the regulated entity rather than the
plaintiff, and thus the Court could easily decide that plaintiffs are not the intended

121. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Env't. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 791 (3d Cir.
2001); Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 431-32 (6th Cir. 2008); Alexander v. Chi. Park Dist.,
773 F.2d 850, 856 (7th Cir. 1985); Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 935-36
(9th Cir. 2003).

122. Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183, 1186-87 (10th Cir. 2002), abrogatedon other
grounds by Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2012).
123. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280-81 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 287 (1978)).
124. Id. at 289 (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981)).
125. Id. at 286 n.6; William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the SAT Creates "Built-In
Headwinds": An Educationaland Legal Analysis of DisparateImpact, 43 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 131, 178-79 (2002).
126. 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
127. Id. at 340-41.
128.

536 U.S. 273, 282-83 (2002).
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beneficiary. 129 In addition, the clear right under Title VI is a right to be free from
intentional discrimination rather than disparate impact discrimination. For these and
other reasons, the Court is likely to reject such claims.130 Therefore, Sandoval has
closed the courthouse door to plaintiffs seeking to remedy disparate impact
discrimination. 131 Congress also has not overruled Sandoval despite the introduction
of more than a dozen bills that have attempted to do so.132 The only remaining avenue
to challenge education policies and practices that impose a disparate impact lies with
the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) with support from the Department of Justice.133
Given that modern-day discrimination is overwhelmingly disparate impact
discrimination rather than intentional discrimination, it is essential that OCR serves
as an effective arbiter for disparate impact claims. However, OCR does not
consistently provide impactful resolution of these claims for two reasons. First,
"OCR is under-staffed, under-funded, and facing record numbers of Title VI
complaints."1 3 4 Underfunding OCR has been an intentional decision by Congress
given Congress's repeated denial of requests from OCR for additional funding so

129. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289 (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294
(1981)).

130. Deborah N. Archer & Kele S. Williams, Making America "The Land of Second
Chances": Restoring Socioeconomic Rights for Ex-offenders, 30 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE

527, 557 (2006); Derek Black, Picking Up the PiecesAfter Alexander v. Sandoval:

Resurrecting a Private Cause ofAction for DisparateImpact, 81 N.C. L. REv. 356, 366-67,
372-74 (2002); Kyle W. La Londe, Who Wants to Be an EnvironmentalJustice Advocate?:
Options for Bringing an Environmental Justice Complaint in the Wake of Alexander v.
Sandoval, 31 B.C. ENV'T AFF. L. REv. 27, 55-56 (2004); James E. Ryan, The Limited
Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern DesegregationCases, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1659,

1698 (2003).
131. See H.R. 2486, 115th Cong. § 2(2) (2017); Black, supra note 130, at 357; Marcela,
supra note 111, at 91-92.
132. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 902, 115th Cong. § 3 (2018); H.R. 2486, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017);
H.R. 3590, 115th Cong. § 6 (2017); H.R. 5260, 114th Cong. § 3 (2016); H.R. 629, 113th Cong.
§ 404 (2013); S. 3322, 112th Cong. § 206 (2012); H.R. 5331, 112th Cong. § 404 (2012); S.
2918, 110th Cong. § 2(11) (2008); H.R. 5896, 110th Cong. §2(11) (2008); S. 2554, 110th
Cong. § 102 (2008); H.R. 5129, 110th Cong. § 102 (2008); S. 4009, 109th Cong. § 3 (2006);
S. 2088, 108th Cong. §§ 102, 103 (2004). Most recently, in 2019 Congressman Robert C. Scott
(D-VA), along with sixteen cosponsors, introduced the Equity and Inclusion Enforcement Act,
which passed the House and is, as of the time of publication, pending before the Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. This Act would restore a private right
of action under section 601. Equity and Inclusion Enforcement Act, H.R. 2574, 116th Cong.
(2019) (as passed by the House, Sept. 16, 2019); see also Noah B. Lindell, Note, Old Dog,
New Tricks: Title VI and Teacher Equity, 35 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 189, 220-21 (2016).
133. COLE, supra note 96, at 1, 16 (noting that the Office for Civil Rights in the U.S.
Department of Education is "the agency primarily responsible for enforcing Title VI in the
public schools, as well as nearly all colleges and universities"); Lindell, supranote 132, at 220
(noting that disparate impact claims must be handled by OCR and the Department of Justice).
But see Black, supra note 130, at 376-77 (proposing that a plaintiff could attempt to enforce
the disparate impact regulations through a deliberate indifference theory).
134. Janel George, Populating the Pipeline: School Policing and the Persistence of the
School-to-Prison Pipeline, 40 NOVA L. REv. 493, 520 (2016).
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that it can expand staff capacity to address complaints. 135 Evidence of this
underfunding and understaffing may be found in the fact that OCR resolved 9250
complaints in fiscal year 2015, which included complaints filed in previous years. 136
These resolved complaints were more than 1000 fewer complaints than the 10,392
complainants filed in 2015.137
Second, although the U.S. Department of Education under the Trump
administration claims that it is serving students more effectively and efficiently than
the Obama administration, 138 other evidence indicates that OCR has decreased
enforcement of civil rights under the Trump administration. 139 For instance, in an
internal memo to OCR offices, the acting assistant secretary for civil rights instructed
the regional offices to end the practice of obtaining three years of data about a
recipient's compliance with federal civil rights law when a complaint is filed.14
Instead, investigators can decide the scope of the investigation that they determine is
warranted to conduct a sound legal investigation and resolution in light of the
allegations in the complaint.141 The Trump administration also revised an
enforcement manual for OCR to institute a "rapid resolution process" that aims to
help schools and complainants quickly resolve complaints with OCR assistance. 14 2
Although one potential outcome to this revised enforcement approach is greater
speed in resolving complaints, this approach also can overlook a pattern and practice
of discrimination that is only evident when prior compliance data is reviewed and
analyzed.
In addition to the Trump administration limiting its enforcement of the Title VI
regulation, the Trump administration's Federal Commission on School Safety
questioned the validity of the disparate impact regulations. 14 3 The commission called
a reading of Title VI that prohibits disparate impact discrimination when Title VI

135. Id.
136. Lindell, supra note 132, at 221-22.
137. Id.
138. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., New Data Show Secretary DeVos' Reforms to
the Office for Civil Rights Are Driving Better Results for Students (July 10, 2019),
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/new-data-show-secretary-devos-reforms-officecivil-rights-are-driving-better-results-students [https://perma.cc/HUK5-8CTN].
139. See Erica L. Green, DeVos Education Dept. Begins Dismissing CivilRights Cases in
Name of Efficiency, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/20/us

/politics/devos-education-department-civil-rights.html [https://perma.cc/2TQU-ZF3R].
140. Memorandum from Candice Jackson, OCR Acting Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Regional Dirs. (June 8, 2017), https://www.documentcloud.org
/documents/3863019-doc00742420170609111824.html [https://perma.cc/45MG-6P77].
141. See id.
142. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., CASE PROCESSING MANUAL 12-13
(2018); Alyson Klein & Christina A. Samuels, Trump Team Reverses ControversialChanges
to
Handling of Civil Rights
Probes, EDUC.
WK.
(Nov.
20,
2018),

http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2018/ 1/tmmp-devos-civil-rights-changes
-manual-special-education-complaints.html [https://perma.cc/V4JH-RTNZ].
143. FED. COMM'N ON SCH. SAFETY, FINAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COMMISSION ON
SCHOOL SAFETY 70 (2018), https://www2.ed.gov/documents/school-safety/school-safety
-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6T3U-QR2R].
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only prohibits intentional discrimination "dubious, at best."14 4 The U.S. Department
of Education under the Trump administration also withdrew an Obama
administration guidance that called for schools to remedy disparate impact
discrimination in school discipline because the guidance adopted a policy position
that was not mandated by Title VI.14 5 These changes and actions reveal that despite
the Trump administration's statements to the contrary, OCR is narrowing the scope
of its civil rights enforcement in ways that can close doors for those who have
experienced disparate impact discrimination.
Furthermore, the disparate impact approach itself has shortcomings that limit its
ability to be an effective mechanism to remedy discrimination. To prove disparate
impact discrimination, a plaintiff must show that a facially neutral policy or practice
imposes a disproportionate adverse effect on a group under Title VI's protection.14 6
Once the plaintiff makes this prima facia case, the defendants must show the policy
or practice is required by educational necessity. 14 7 To prove an educational necessity,
a defendant must show "that the challenged decision was necessary to meeting a goal
that was legitimate, important, and integral to the defendant's institutional
mission."14 8 A plaintiff can still prevail if she or he can provide a comparably
effective alternative that imposes less of a disparate impact or prove that the
justification is a pretext for discrimination. 149
Prohibitions of disparate impact discrimination do not provide effective
protection against discrimination for several reasons. Judges exercise broad latitude
when determining whether an education policy or practice serves an educational
necessity." This wide discretion exists in part because neither Congress nor the
Department of Education has defined what this phrase should mean.151 When
exercising this discretion, some courts apply a rigorous standard, such as requiring
that the practice "bear[s] a manifest demonstrable relationship to classroom
education,"12 which courts have interpreted to mean that the practice "is
demonstrably necessary to meeting an important educational goal."153 Other courts
apply a lenient standard that only requires the practice to significantly serve a

144.
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[https://penna.cc
/6XUU-CRSB].
146. Elstonv. Talladega Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing
Ga. State Conf. of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985)).
147. Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 983 (9th Cir. 1984).
148. Elston, 997 F.2d at 1413.
149. Id. at 1407 (citing Ga. State Conf ofBranches ofNAACP, 775 F.2d at 1417).
150.

Jennifer C. Braceras, Killing the Messenger: The Misuse of DisparateImpact Theory

to Challenge High-Stakes EducationalTests, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1111, 1193 (2002).
151. See Jay P. Heubert, Nondiscriminatory Use of High-Stakes Tests: Combining
Professional Test-Use Standards with FederalCivil-Rights Enforcement, 133 EDUC. L. REP.

17, 26-27 (1999).
152. Ga. State Conf of Branches of NAACP, 775 F.2d at 1418.
153. Elston, 997 F.2d at 1412.
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legitimate goal. 154 Thus, the burden on educational institutions to prove educational
necessity varies among the courts. This variation leaves victims of discrimination
without a reliable avenue to vindicate their rights.
In addition, courts typically defer to educators' policy decisions about the
importance of the practice to a legitimate educational goal, which can make the
educational necessity standard fairly easy to meet. 155 Although it is well established
that intentional discrimination is difficult to prove, it is less well known that
"[d]isparate impact claims are more difficult to prove than standard intentional
discrimination claims." 156 These and other shortcomings157 of disparate impact
claims make them an ineffective tool for proving discrimination in education.
This array of shortcomings of federal civil rights laws and their enforcement for
education results in schoolchildren lacking even the narrow definition of civil rights
that is limited to nondiscrimination. The next subpart shows that schoolchildren also
lack federal protection for the broader understanding of education as a civil right that
protects human flourishing that would require guaranteeing a positive right to
education.
2. The Absence of a Federal Right to Education
The U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize a constitutional right to education
when it was presented with the opportunity to do so. In a 5-4 1973 decision, the Court
rejected a claim that substantial funding disparities between districts in Texas
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 158 The Court
held that the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly protect a right to education and
refused to imply such a right. 159 The Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
close nexus between education and effective exercise of the right to free speech and
to vote justified protecting education as a constitutional right, noting that despite the
Court's zealous protection from unjustifiable government interference with these
rights, "we have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to

154. Lucero v. Detroit Pub. Sch., 160 F. Supp. 2d 767, 788 (E.D. Mich. 2001); see also
Zachary W. Best, Derailing the Schoolhouse-to-Jailhouse Track: Title VI and a New
Approach to DisparateImpactAnalysis in Public Education, 99 GEO. L.J. 1671, 1690 (2011)

(identifying these interpretations of educational necessity in the cases).
155. See Kidder & Rosner, supra note 125, at 191 (noting that when courts determine if a
practice serves an educational necessity they typically "have given considerable deference to
the professional testing industry and to defendants such as state school boards").
156.

Michael Selmi, Was the DisparateImpact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701,

734 (2006) (noting that the difficulty of proving disparate impact discrimination is particularly
important because employment discrimination is challenging to prove).
157. See Blakely Latham Fernandez, Comment, TAAS and GI Forum v.
Texas Education Agency: A CriticalAnalysis andProposalfor RedressingProblems with the
StandardizedTesting in Texas, 33 ST. MARY's L.J. 143, 167 (2001) ("[B]ecause courts usually

defer to state and local administrators in the area of education, even a superior alternative to
the challenged practice will likely be dismissed."); Selmi, supra note 156, at 706-07 ("The
disparate impact theory also has proven a poor vehicle for uncovering subtle discrimination.
. . ").

158. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1973).
159. Id. at 35.

2020]

0 LGAL ARCHITE CTURE_ TO PROTECT EDUCA TION

75

guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral
choice." 160 Furthermore, the Court explained that the plaintiffs had not established
that the students were prevented from gaining the "basic minimal skills" necessary
to enjoy these rights.161
After rejecting arguments that education is a fundamental right, the Court applied
rational basis review to the constitutionality of the challenged funding disparities.16 2
The Court noted that this deferential review provided the appropriate framework
because the Court lacked the expertise to second-guess the judgments of lawmakers
on how to dispense with taxes and how to resolve the educational disputes at the
heart of the case, such as whether money influenced educational outcomes.163 The
Court also highlighted that it did not want to disrupt the balance of education
federalism.164 The Court upheld the Texas funding system as legitimately related to
Texas's interest in local control of schools. 165 The Court noted that it was not placing
its imprimatur on the Texas school funding approach, given the clear need for greater
equality and improved quality in educational opportunities as well as the potential
overreliance on the property tax to fund schools.166 Instead, it left reform in the hands
of state legislatures. 167 Therefore, Rodriguez closed the federal courthouse door to
litigation challenging inequities in school funding, at least temporarily.168
Litigants have recently returned to federal court and have sought to establish
federal constitutional protection for education. The plaintiffs in Gary B. v. Whitmer
won an important breakthrough in 2020 when they convinced a three-judge panel of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that the children in a variety of Detroit
public schools were denied their fundamental right to a basic minimum education
that protected their right to literacy in violation of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 169 The Sixth Circuit noted that
substantive due process protects those rights that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition" and "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that
'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.'" 1 7 It held that
"[a]ccess to a foundational level of literacy-provided through public educationhas an extensive historical legacy and is so central to our political and social system

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 36 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 37.
Id. at 37, 40-44.
Id. at 41-42.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 59. Rodriguez also held that wealth is not a suspect class. Id. at 28.
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Creating New Pathways to

Equal Educational Opportunity, in THE ENDURING LEGACY OF RODRIGUEZ: CREATING NEW
PATHWAYS TO EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, supranote

13, at 263, 264.
169. 957 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2020), vacated958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020) (en banc). The
Detroit Public Schools educate a high concentration of African American students because the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Milliken v. Bradley prevented the lower courts from
implementing an interdistrict remedy that would have resulted in more integrated schools. 418
U.S. 717 (1974).
170. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 643-44 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 72021(1997)).
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as to be 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 171 Although the court refused to
define the exact contours of the right, the court noted that the plaintiffs are entitled
to the "facilities, teaching, and educational materials (e.g., books)" that are
"sufficient for students to plausibly attain literacy within the educational system at
issue." 172
The court remanded the decision to allow plaintiffs to present evidence on
whether their right to a basic minimum education had been denied. 173 The plaintiffs
then settled the litigation. In the settlement, among other actions, Governor Gretchen
Whitmer committed to recommending and supporting legislation to provide $94.4
million for literacy-related programs and initiatives for the Detroit Public School
Community District, including such programs as teacher training to improve the
reading skills of struggling readers, increasing academic and reading interventionists,
reducing K-3 class size to twenty, targeted facilities improvements, and books,
materials, and technology for the students for at home use.174 Governor Whitmer also
agreed to pay $3 million to settle the case, with a portion of the funds to be used for
literacy training for the named plaintiffs and the remaining $2.7 million to be paid to
the Detroit Public School Community District to adopt such literacy supports as
literacy coaches and interventionists, resources for use at home, and targeted
facilities improvements.17 5 After the case settled, an en banc court vacated the
decision when it decided to rehear the case. 17 6 However, given that the litigation had
settled, no rehearing occurred.
Other litigants have pursued relief from substandard educational opportunities
and outcomes in federal court. In A. C. ex rel. Waithe v. Raimondo, a federal court
rejected the plaintiffs' allegations that the State of Rhode Island has not provided
students with an education that would enable them to serve productively as civic
participants who are equipped to vote, serve on a jury, and understand our
government institutions in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, among other
constitutional protections.177 The court held that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez compelled the dismissal of
the case because although it is desirable and even critical to receive a civic education,
17
"this is not something the U.S. Constitution contemplates or mandates."?
Despite

171. Id. at 642 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21).

172. Id. at 660.
173. Id. at 660-62.
174. Terms for Settlement Agreement and Release Between All Plaintiffs and the
Governor of the State of Michigan in Gary B., et al. v. Whitmer, 2 (May 13, 2020),
http://www.publiccounsel.org/tools/assets/files/1382.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W2BT-2KAE]
(unpublished settlement agreement).
175. Id. at 3. The settlement also created the Detroit Literacy Equity Task Force to evaluate
literacy annually in Detroit and to provide recommendations to the Governor on how to
improve literacy. A Detroit Educational Policy Committee also will advise and make
recommendations to the Governor and the Superintendent of Public Instruction and they will
review and act upon these recommendations. Id. at 4-5.
176. Gary B. v. Whitmer, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020) (enbanc).
177. A.C. v. Raimondo, No. 1:18-CV-00645, 2020 WL 6042105 (D. R.I. 2020), appeal
docketed, No. 20-2082 (1St Cir. Nov. 10, 2020).
178. Id. at*17.
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reaching this conclusion, the court took pains to highlight the importance of the
plaintiffs' allegation as "a cry for help from a generation of young people" who
acknowledge, as do many scholars and other leaders, "that American democracy is
in peril."17 9 While denying legal relief, the court explained the myriad ways in which
our democracy is endangered in modern society and the centrality of a robust
education system to strengthening it.180
A federal court also rejected the claims in Martinez v. Malloy, in which
schoolchildren and parents in Hartford and Bridgeport, Connecticut, filed litigation
in federal court against the Governor and various state officials. The plaintiffs
alleged, among other things, that the defendants violated their rights under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses by keeping plaintiffs in failing schools that
denied them "their fundamental right to a minimally adequate education." 181 The
court noted it was bound by Rodriguez to reject the plaintiffs' claims. 182 It explained
that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause does not guarantee a
"fundamental right to substantial equality of educational opportunity" and that this
clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause do not protect a
"fundamental right to a minimally adequate education." 1 8 3
Despite the limited success of litigation to establish a federal right to education
thus far, the renewed interest in litigation to recognize a federal right to education
suggests that reformers are recognizing the benefits of a federal forum to remedy
substandard educational opportunities.184 The initial win in GaryB. also suggests that
the ground may be more fertile for recognition of such a right than it has been in over
forty years. However, for schoolchildren in public schools today, a federal right to
education remains illusory and out of reach.
The next subpart shows that, like the federal government, the states fail to
consistently protect education as a civil right, either through comprehensive
antidiscrimination protections or through effective protection of state rights to
education.
B. State Law Does Not Consistently and Effectively ProtectEducation as a Civil
Right
All state constitutions provide protection for education.185 Yet, state laws vary
significantly in the scope of their prohibitions of discrimination in education and their
protection of education as a substantive right. The disparate scope and enforcement
of these laws makes the civil rights protections of students fluctuate based on their
place of residence rather than on the discriminatory harm that the child is

179. Id. at *2.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at *2-7.
Martinez v. Malloy, 350 F. Supp. 3d 74, 83-84 (D. Conn. 2018).
Id. at 90-91.
Id.

184. Robinson, supra note 3, at 334.
185. Scott R. Bauries, The Education Duty, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 705, 719 (2012);
Derek W. Black, Averting Educational Crisis: Funding Cuts, Teacher Shortages, and the
Dwindling Commitment to PublicEducation, 94 WASH. UNIV. L. REv. 423, 426 (2016).

79

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 96:51

experiencing in education. These inconsistencies confirm that state laws alone cannot
effectively protect education as a civil right.

1. The Divergent and Ineffective Approaches to State Antidiscrimination Laws in
Education
State protections from discrimination in education vary widely in their coverage.
For instance, when considering protections against racial discrimination, at least
seventeen states have adopted constitutional provisions that prohibit racial
discrimination against students in education. 186 At least thirty-five states and the
District of Columbia have enacted state statutes that prohibit racial discrimination in
education with the scope of coverage ranging from a broad prohibition of
discrimination to a more limited prohibition of segregation or discrimination in
specific aspects of education such as admissions. 187 At least thirty-four states and the

186. These seventeen states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oklahoma,
Washington, and Wyoming. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 36(A); id art. XX, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 31(a); COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 8; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 2; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO
CONST. art. IX, § 6; KY. CONST. § 187; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 13(D)(1); MASS. CONST. art.
CXI; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(2); id art. VIII, § 2; MONT. CONST. art. X, § 7; NEB. CONST.
art. I, § 30(1); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 5; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 10; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 36(A);
WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 10; see also supratext accompanying note
200-03 (highlighting the disparate coverage of state protections from discrimination). The
New Mexico Constitution solely protects children of Spanish descent from discrimination in
admissions to public schools, prohibits their segregation and states that they "shall forever
enjoy perfect equality with other children in all public schools and educational institutions of
the state...." N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 10. The Constitution of the State of New Columbia was
ratified in 1982 but holds no legal force, as Congress has not granted statehood status to the
District of Columbia. For the purposes of this Article, however, it is worth noting that this
D.C. constitutional language possesses both a general provision on freedom from
discrimination and a guarantee of equal educational opportunity. Constitution of the State of
New Columbia (Ratified 1982), art. I, § 3; id art. VI, § 1(B); 1 D.C. CODE §§ 299, 301, 319
(2013).
187. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-10-114(a)(1) (2018); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 200, 220 (Deering
Supp. 2019); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 35351, 51500 (Deering 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1015c(a) (2019); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.41 (2016); FLA. STAT. §§ 1000.05(2)(a), 1002.20(7)
(2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-131 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-5901, 67-5909(7)(a)
(2014); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-22.5 (2018); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 20-33-1-1, 20-33-1-4, 2033-1-5 (LexisNexis 2015); IOWA CODE §§ 216.9(1), 280.3(2) (2019); LA. STAT. ANN. §§
17:111(A), 17:221.2(D) (2013); ME. STAT. tit. 5, §§ 4601, 4602(3) (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 76, § 5, ch. 151C, § 2 (2018); MICH. CoMP. LAWS SERV. §§ 37.2402, 380.1146(1)
(LexisNexis 2019); MINN. STAT. §§ 123B.30, 363A.02(1)(a)(5), 363A.13 (2018); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 37-15-35 (2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-307 (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1807
(West 2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 193:38, 354-A:27 (Supp. 2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
18A:36-20 (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:38-5.1 (Westlaw through Laws 2019, ch.
436); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 12 (Consol. Supp. 2019); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 313(3) (Consol. 2009);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 291(2) (Consol. Supp. 2019); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(4) (Westlaw through
Laws 2020, ch. 21); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-367 (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.06
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District of Columbia have enacted legislation that prohibits racial discrimination in
charter schools.188 More than a dozen states and the District of Columbia prohibit

(D)(1) (LexisNexis 2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 1210.201 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §

&

329.025 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659.850 (West Supp. 2019); 24 PA. STAT.
CONS. STAT. §§ 13-1310(a), 15-1521, 5002, 5004(a) (2019); 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-38-1
(2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-40(1) (2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-28-44 (2018); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-22 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-1003(b) (Supp. 2019); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 49-6-3109(a) (2016); TEx. EDUC. CODE. ANN. § 29.203(d) (West 2018); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 165(a) (Supp. 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3900(B) (2017); WASH. REV.
CODE § 49.60.400(1) (2019); WIS. STAT. §§ 106.58, 118.13(1) (2017-2018); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-4-303 (2019). Compare IOWA CODE §§ 216.9(1) (2019) ("It is an unfair or discriminatory

practice for any educational institution to discriminate on the basis of race, creed, color, sex,
sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, religion, or disability in any program or
activity.") and FLA. STAT. §§ 1000.05(2)(a)(2019) ("Discrimination on the basis of race,
ethnicity, national origin, gender, disability, religion, or marital status against a student or an
employee in the state system of public K-20 education is prohibited. No person in this state
shall, on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, disability, religion, or marital
status, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any public K-20 education program or activity ... conducted by a public
educational institution that receives or benefits from federal or state financial assistance.")
with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-367 (2019) ("No person shall be refused admission to or be
excluded from any public school in this State on account of race, creed, color or national
origin.") and OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 1210.201 (2011) ("Segregation of children in the public
schools of the State of Oklahoma on account of race, creed, color or national origin is
prohibited.") In addition, Missouri prohibits race discrimination in the provision of English
language services to students. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 161.223 (West 2018). Alaska also has a
specific education discrimination provision, but the provision only prohibits racial
discrimination in teacher employment, not against students receiving an education. ALASKA
STAT. § 14.18.010 (2018) ("[D]iscrimination on the basis of sex against an employee or a
student in public education in Alaska and discrimination against an employee on the basis of
race violate art. I, § 3 of the Alaska Constitution and are prohibited.").
188. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-23-306(6) (2018); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 235 (Deering 2009); CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 47605(e)(2)(B)(iii) (Deering Supp. 2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-104(3)
(2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 506(a)(4) (2015); D.C. CODE § 38-1802.06(b) (2018); FLA.
STAT. § 1002.33(10)(e)(5) (2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-2066(c) (2016); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 302D-34(a) (LexisNexis 2019); IDAHO CODE § 33-5206(1) (Supp. 2019); 105 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/27A-2(b)(2), 4(a) (2018); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-24-2-2 (LexisNexis 2019);
IOWA CODE § 256F.4(2) (2019); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 160.1592(15) (LexisNexis 2017); LA.
STAT. ANN. § 17:3991(B)(3) (Supp. 2019); ME. STAT. tit. 20-A, § 2404(3) (2018); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 71, § 89(m) (2018); MICH. CoMP. LAWS SERV. § 380.504(2) (LexisNexis 2015);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-28-23(3), 37-28-43 (2019); Mo. REV. STAT. § 160.410(3) (2016);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 388A.453(6) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194B:8(I) (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-7 (West Supp. 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B4(a) (West 2011); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2854(2)(a) (Consol. Supp. 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
115C-218.45(e), 115C-218.55 (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.06(D)(1) (LexisNexis
2018); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 338.125(2)(c) (West Supp. 2019); 24 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1715-A(3), 17-1723-A(b)(1) (West 2019); 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 16-77.27(15), 16-77.3-7(15) (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-40-40(2) (2019); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-4050(B)(1), (7) (West 2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-2405(d)(2)(J) (Supp. 2019); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 49-13-111(b) (2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53G-6-502(9) (2018); W. VA. CODE § 18-
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racial discrimination in school choice. 189 In addition to these education-specific
protections against racial discrimination, most states have enacted a general
constitutional protection against racial discrimination.190
Unfortunately, this body of state law does not serve as effective protection against
racial discrimination in education for several reasons. First, the origin of some of
these protections make them more likely to be used as tools to limit equal educational
opportunity rather than to advance it. For example, at least five states (Arizona,
California, Michigan, Nebraska, and Oklahoma) adopted their constitutional antidiscrimination protections for education as part of statewide efforts to ban
affirmative action, which is a practice that can expand educational opportunities for
minority students.191 In addition, both Delaware and Kentucky merely removed their
Jim Crow requirements for "separate, but equal" education and now require "equal"

5G-11(a)(6) (West 2019); Wis. STAT. § 118.40(4)(b)(2) (2017-2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-

3-304(c) (2019). Some states prohibit discrimination in charter schools but do not explicitly
or implicitly include race discrimination in the prohibition. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-6F5(a)(3) (Supp. 2019); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-184(F) (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 3140(D) (Supp. 2019); TEX. EDUC. CODE § 12.111(a)(5) (Supp. 2019).
189. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-6D-8(d)(2) (2012); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-1204(I)
(2019); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-18-227(d)(2)(B), 6-18-1903(d)(3) (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 202-131 (2016); IND. CODE. ANN § 20-51-4-3(a) (West 2019); IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.11 S (6)(b)
(West 2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 76, § 12B(j) (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §
388.1705(8) (LexisNexis 2019); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.976 (A)(4), (6) (LexisNexis
2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68 § 2357.206 (2018); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 339.127(1), 339.128(1)
(2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-3790(A)(1)(b) (West 2018); TENN. CODE ANN §§ 49-10-1404
(2016); TEX. EDUC. CODE § 29.203(d) (West 2018). The Scholarships for Opportunity and
Results (SOAR) Act provides school choice in the District of Columbia and prohibits race
discrimination in the program. Scholarships for Opportunity and Results Act, H.R. 471, 112th
Cong. § 8(a) (2011); D.C. CODE §§ 38-1853.08 (Supp. 2020). The Act authorizes a federally
funded voucher program, the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program.
190. See JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 3.01[2] (4th ed. 2006). See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3; CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 7; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1,
para. 2; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2; LA. CONST. art. I § 3; ME. CONST. art.
I, § 6-A; MASS. CONST. art. CVI; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2; MO. CONST. art. I, § 2; MONT.
CONST. art. II, § 4; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. II; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 5;
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19; N.D. CONST. art.
I, § 21; PA. CONST. art. I, § 26; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3; TEX. CONST. art.
I, § 3a; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11; WYO. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3.
191. ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 36(A); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(2);
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 30(1); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 36(A); see also Grutterv. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 330-33 (2003) (noting the benefits of affirmative action for making higher education
accessible to all racial groups); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Comment, Fisher's Cautionary
Tale and the Urgent Need for Equal Access to an Excellent Education, 130 HARV. L. REv.

185, 188 (2016) (noting that affirmative action aims to ensure equality); Kimberly Jenkins
Robinson, The ConstitutionalFuture of Race-Neutral Efforts to Achieve Diversity and Avoid

Racial Isolation in Our Elementary andSecondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. REv. 277, 279 (2009)
(noting that numerous districts consider race in their student assignment plans to achieve
diversity and reduce racial isolation).
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educational funding. 192 Not surprisingly, these provisions are not being used to
advance education as a civil right. Furthermore, Colorado amended its state
constitution to forbid busing to achieve racial integration in public schools and
litigation of the provision has focused on limiting busing rather than protecting the
civil rights of schoolchildren.193
Second, the disparate scope of coverage for these state laws means that a child's
protection from racial and other forms of discrimination varies from state to state and
some children are left with very limited protection from discrimination. For example,
seven states have neither a constitutional nor statutory protection against racial
discrimination in education. 194 Most states, including most of these seven states,
possess a general prohibition against racial discrimination.195 However, these
provisions also may have a limited impact because numerous states interpret their
constitutional nondiscrimination provisions as consistent with the federal Equal
Protection Clause 196 (which only reaches intentional discrimination) 197 or they have

192. Compare DEL. CONST. art. X, § 2 ("[I]n such [school funding] apportionment, no
distinction shall be made on account of race or color."), with DEL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (amended
1995) ("[I]n such [school funding] apportionment, no distinction shall be made on account of
race or color, and separate schools for white and colored children shall be maintained.");
compare KY. CONST. § 187 ("In distributing the school fund no distinction shall be made on
account of race or color."), with KY. CONST. § 187 (amended 1996) ("In distributing the school
fund no distinction shall be made on account of race or color, and separate schools for white
and colored children shall be maintained.").
193. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 8 ("[N]or shall any distinction or classification of pupils be
made on account of race or color, nor shall any pupil be assigned or transported to any public
educational institution for the purpose of achieving racial balance."); see Keyes v. Congress
of Hisp. Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274, 1283 (D. Colo. 1995) ("The only question now before
this court is whether the Busing Clause is incompatible with the District's duty to provide
educational opportunities without racial or ethnic inequalities. The answer is no. The words
'integration' and 'desegregation' are not synonyms."); see also Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 119
F.3d 1437, 1445-46 (10th Cir. 1997) (dismissing an appeal on whether the Busing Clause is
unconstitutional as unripe and, therefore, nonjusticiable).
194. These seven states are Alabama, Kansas, Maryland, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, and
West Virginia.
195. See supra note 190.

.

196. See, e.g., Hetrick v. Ohio Dep't of Agriculture, 98 N.E.3d 1199, 1214-15 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2017) ("The Equal Protection Clause in the Ohio Constitution is 'functionally equivalent'
to the right established by the Fourteenth Amendment.... '[I]n order to establish a violation
of the right to equal protection, a party must show that the agency purposely or intentionally
discriminated in its application of the statute."') (citations omitted); Odunlade v. City of
Minneapolis, 823 N.W.2d 638, 647-48 (Minn. 2012) (rejecting a claim under the state's equal
protection clause because the plaintiff could not prove intentional discrimination); People v.
Conat, 605 N.W.2d 49, 59-60 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) ("The state constitutional guarantee [of
equal protection of the law] provides no greater protection than does its federal counterpart.
. . The party challenging the statute must demonstrate that it evidences intentional
discrimination against a particular group of persons.").
197. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976).
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otherwise determined that the provision does not prohibit disparate impact
discrimination. 198
State prohibitions of discrimination in education also vary widely in the scope of
coverage from broad coverage to quite limited coverage. For instance, although
many states have adopted a general proscription of discrimination in schools, 199 some
state prohibitions only reach admissions to public schools, segregation, or funding.2 00
State protections from discrimination in education also do not consistently reach
disparities in the quality of education. 201 Furthermore, although some states interpret
their education-specific prohibitions of discrimination to reach disparate impact

.

198. Rollins v. State, 991 P.2d 202, 210 (Alaska 1999); Golab v. City of New Britain, 529
A.2d 1297, 1301 (Conn. 1987); Montoy v. State, 102 P.3d 1160, 1162-63 (Kan. 2005); State
v. Baxley, 656 So.2d 973, 978 (La. 1995); Aucella v. Town of Winslow, 583 A.2d 215, 216
(Me. 1990); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 510 (Mo. 1992); Greenberg v. Kimmelman,
494 A.2d 294, 308 (N.J. 1985); Abbeville Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 538 (S.C.
1999).
199. See, e.g., ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 36(A); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a); IOWA CODE §
280.3(2) (2019); MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
200. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. X, § 2 ("[T]he General Assembly shall make provision.
for the benefit of the free public schools .

. .

. [I]n such apportionment [of funding], no

distinction shallbe made on account of race or color."); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-22.5 (2018)
(" [N]o pupil shall be excluded from or segregated in any such school on account of his color,
race, sex, or nationality."); Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-15-35 (2019) ("No person shallbe assigned
to or by, or restricted from or to, any group, area, school, institution or other political
subdivision of the State of Mississippi on the account of race, color, or national origin. There
shall be no governmentally enforced segregation by race, color or national origin and there
shall be no governmentally enforced integration by reason of race, color or national origin.");
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-367 (2019) ("No person shall be refused admission to or be excluded
from any public school in this State on account of race, creed, color or national origin. No
school attendance district or zone shall be drawn for the purpose of segregating persons of
various races, creeds, colors or national origins from the community."); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, §
1210.201 (2011) ("Segregation of children in the public schools of the State of Oklahoma on
account of race, creed, color or national origin is prohibited."); 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-38-1
(2013) ("No person shall be excluded from any public school on account of race or color, or
for being over fifteen (15) years of age, nor except by force of some general regulation
applicable to all persons under the same circumstances."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-40(1)
(2020) ("No person shall be refused admission into or be excluded from any public school in
the State on account of race, creed, color or national origin."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-63109(a) (2016) ("No person shall be refused admission into or be excluded from any public
school in this state on account of race, creed, color, sex or national origin.").
201. Robert M. Jensen, Advancing Education Through Education Clauses of State

Constitutions, 1997 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 8 (1997).
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discrimination, 20 2 others do not. 203 In those states that do not prohibit disparate
impact discrimination in education, schoolchildren will face the same difficulties as
federal plaintiffs in proving intentional discrimination that are outlined above. 204 This
patchwork of state civil rights laws does not effectively protect children against both
intentional and de facto discrimination in all aspects of education.
2. The Ineffectiveness of Many State Rights to Education
Like state antidiscrimination protections of education, state protections of a
positive right to education fail to protect education as a civil right. State education

202. Louisiana's constitutional protection from discrimination in education explicitly
prohibits disparate impact discrimination. See LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 13. Courts also have
interpreted other state constitutional protections against discrimination in education to prohibit
actions that have the effect of discriminating. For example, California's courts have held that
the state's constitution obliges school boards to "take reasonable steps to alleviate segregation
in the public schools, whether the segregation be de facto or de jure in origin." Tinsley v. Palo
Alto Unified Sch. Dist., 154 Cal. Rptr. 591, 606 (Ct. App. 1979). Additionally, the New
Mexico Constitution ensures "[c]hildren of Spanish descent in the state of New Mexico . .
shall never be classed in separate schools, but shall forever enjoy perfect equality with other
children in all public schools." N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 10. A federal court interpreted this
provision to prohibit intentional or disparate impact discrimination when it rejected a claim
that the New Mexico Bilingual Multicultural Education Act was unconstitutional. See Carbajal
v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch. Dist., No. CIV98-279 MV/DJS, 1999 WL 35809583, at *13
(D.N.M. May 14, 1999). However, the parties in the case both agreed that the provision
addressed intentional and disparate impact discrimination and the court embraced the parties'
analysis. See id. New Jersey also interpreted its state constitutional protection against
discrimination in education to prohibit disparate impact discrimination. See Jenkins v. Twp.
of Morris Sch. Dist., 279 A.2d 619, 628-30 (N.J. 1971) (interpreting the New Jersey
constitution to empower the State Commissioner to have the "power to cross district lines to
avoid 'segregation in fact"'). In addition, some states prohibit disparate impact or
unintentional discrimination in education. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 329.025 (West
2014); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 659.850 (West Supp. 2019). Some states, such as Michigan and
Oregon, and the District of Columbia interpret their education-specific statutes to prohibit
racial discrimination. See Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown
Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 29 (D.C. 1987); Emeagwali v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 209841,
1999 WL 33433560, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 1999); Nakashima v. Or. State Bd. of
Educ., 185 P.3d 429, 436-37 (Or. 2008).
203. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-10-114(a)(1) (2018) ("It shall be unlawful for any
member of the board of directors, administrator, or employee of a public school to knowingly
authorize the participation of students in an event or activity held at a location where some
students would be excluded or not given equal treatment because of the student's race, national
origin, or ethnic background.") (emphasis added); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189,
208-10 (1973) (noting that under the Colorado anti-discrimination provision for education, a
plaintiff must prove that intentional discrimination was "among the factors" motivating the
governmental acts of segregation for at least a portion of the school district to receive an initial
presumption of intentional discrimination).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 99-114.
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rights vary widely in their strength and effectiveness. 205 Some variation is
unsurprising and reasonable given the differences among states, 206 including
variability in geography, delivery methods, economic capacity, and costs. However,
these differences do not fully explain why some states provide children an excellent
education while others offer second-rate educational opportunities. 207 Those who
rely on the laboratory of the states to ensure educational excellence and equity 2 0
continue to misplace their trust in a laboratory that has failed many children for
generations, with poor and minority students too often receiving the worst
opportunities.2"
Current state law fails to protect education as a civil right because state rights to
education do not consistently ensure the educational opportunities "that protect those
aspects of our natural capabilities most conducive to social participation and wellbeing." 210 It is important to acknowledge the substantial gains made by successful
school funding litigation in such states as New Jersey,21 New York,2 1 2 and
Kentucky2 1 3 and the successes in litigation about state rights to education in almost
half of the states. 2 When a state recognizes a right to education, students and their
families can gain a powerful weapon to fight for high-quality educational
opportunities and outcomes in both the courtroom and in democratic politics. 215

205. See Kristine L. Bowman, The Inadequate Right to Education: A Case Study of
Obstacles to State Protection, in A FEDERAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS
FOR OUR DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 65, 76.
206. Kristi L. Bowman, The Failure of Education Federalism, 51 UNIV. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 1, 19 (2017).
207. Id. at 40; Robinson, supra note 2, at 1-7.
208.

JEFFREY

S.

SUTTON, 51

IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS:

STATES AND THE MAKING OF

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 40 (2018).

209. Robinson, supra note 2, at 3-7.

210. WEST, supra note 27, at 217.
211. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). For a discussion of the New
Jersey litigation and the legislative response, please see David G. Sciarra & Danielle Fame,
From Rodriguez to Abbott: New Jersey'sStandards-LinkedSchool Funding Reform, in THE
ENDURING LEGACY OF RODRIGUEZ: CREATING NEW PATHWAYS FOR EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY, supra note 13, at 119, 119-42.
212. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003).

213. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
The Kentucky Supreme Court identified a variety of skills conducive to social participation
and well-being, such as: "sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and
physical wellness; ... sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his
or her cultural and historical heritage; . . . sufficient training or preparation for advanced
training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and pursue
life work intelligently; and . . . sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable
public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in
academics or in the job market." Id. These reforms resulted in increased funding with modest
interdistrict inequality as well as significant achievement gains when compared to Kentucky's
pre-Rose student performance. NEWMAN, supra note 20, at 81-82.
214. NEWMAN, supra note 20, at 114.
215. Id.
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Social science research confirms that substantial funding reforms can lead to
significant funding increases and improved academic outcomes. 21 6 A review of
national longitudinal studies on the impact of school finance reforms offers
"compelling new evidence of the large-scale achievement and economic benefits of
substantive and sustained additional funding for schools serving higher-poverty
student populations." 217 For instance, C. Kirabo Jackson, Rucker Johnson, and
Claudia Persico found that a 25% spending increase over the twelve years of a child's
education could eliminate the gap in educational attainment between disadvantaged
students and their classmates. 218 A more modest 10% increase in per pupil funding
for twelve years helped to increase high school graduation rates by 10% for poor
students and 7% for all students. 219 This 10% increase also reduced adult poverty and
increased adult earnings. 220 Another national longitudinal study that relied upon data
from the National Assessment of Educational Progress found that school finance
reforms resulted in improved student outcomes. 221
However, although some courts are willing to acknowledge that state education
rights are being violated, "courts ... are generally much less willing to ensure that
legislatures do what it takes to fix them." 222 Courts also too often steer clear of the
types of comprehensive reforms that would protect education as a civil right, such as
reducing the influence of wealth over education by reconfiguring districts to
redistribute property wealth or ending the reliance on property taxes. 223 State courts
also oftentimes struggle with creating "an enforceable remedy" for violations of a
state right to education given the absence of standards for mutual enforcement of
both adequacy and equity. 224
More importantly, students in states with no or unsuccessful litigation regarding
their state's right to education are left to the legislative and executive whims of
elected officials who too often operate education systems in ways that provide subpar

216. Julien Lafortune, Jesse Rothstein & Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, School Finance
Reform andthe DistributionofStudentAchievement, AM. ECON. J. APPLIED ECON., Apr. 2018,
at 1; C. Kirabo Jackson, Rucker Johnson & Claudia Persico, The Effect of School Finance
Reforms on the Distribution of Spending, Academic Achievement, and Adult Outcomes 43

(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 20118, 2014).
217. BRUCE D. BAKER, LEARNING POLICY INST., How MONEY MATTERS FOR SCHOOLS 6-7
(2017).
218. C. Kirabo Jackson, Rucker C. Johnson & Claudia Persico, The Effects of School
Spending on Educationaland Economic Outcomes: Evidence from School FinanceReforms,

131 Q.J. ECON. 157, 214 (2016).
219. See id. at 193. The study also found a 2.5% improvement in graduation rates for
nonpoor students after a 10% increase in funding for twelve years, but this improvement was
not statistically significant. Id.
220. See id. at 160.
221.

Lafortune et al., supra note 216.

222.

JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TwO SCHOOLS, AND

THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA

155 (2010).

223. See id. at 151-53.
224. Joshua E. Weishart, Protecting a Federal Right to Educational Equality and
FOR OUR
DEMOCRACY 303, 304 (Kimberly Jenkins Robinson ed., 2019) (explaining how both adequacy
and equity could be protected through a federal right to education).
Adequacy, in A FEDERAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS
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educational opportunities for many poor and minority students.22 5 Public officials
operate too many state education systems in ways that fall short of ensuring students
receive the educational opportunities that are necessary for education to achieve its
intended aims. For instance, many states fail to ensure the educational opportunities
needed to engage in civic participation.2 2 6 States also too often neglect the
development of the skills and capacities that students need to thrive and succeed,
such as effective reading and math skills.2 2 7 As the U.S. Equity and Excellence
Commission acknowledged in its 2013 report:
[A]ny honest assessment must acknowledge that our efforts to date to
confront the vast gaps in educational outcomes separating different
groups of young Americans have yet to include a serious and sustained
commitment to ending the appalling inequities-in school funding, in
early education, in teacher quality, in resources for teachers and students
and in governance-that contribute so mightily to these gaps. 228
The enduring educational opportunity and achievement gaps reveal the ways that
state rights to education fail to create and sustain schools that empower children to
engage effectively with the world around them and to secure their own welfare. 2 2 9
Michigan provides a compelling example of a state right to education that fails to
ensure that children receive the necessary skills to engage productively with society
or sustain their own well-being, as Kristine Bowman recently documented. 230
Michigan's state constitution requires the legislature to provide a free public
education, and this education must be provided without race, color, national origin,
or religious discrimination.231 In 1972, the Governor and Attorney General of
Michigan brought a declaratory judgment action under the Michigan and federal
equal protection clauses against the state's school funding system, with the State
Treasurer serving as the defendant. 232 The court initially granted a judgment finding
the system unconstitutional given the great disparities between districts in the ability
to raise property taxes. 2 3 3 After the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' Equal
Protection claims in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the
Michigan Supreme Court justices quickly overturned the prior ruling after two new

225. See THE EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE COMM'N, supra note 3, at 14.
226. REBELL, supra note 67, at 2.
227. See NAEP Report Card: Reading: National Student Group Scores and Score Gaps,
THE NATION'S REPORT CARD (2019), www.nationsreportcard.gov/reading/nation/groups

/?grade=4 [https://perma.cc/Z7FX-WELT]; NAEP Report Card: Mathematics: National
Student

Group Scores

and Score

Gaps, THE NATION'S

REPORT

CARD

(2019),

www.nationsreportcard.gov/mathematics/nation/groups/?grade=4 [https://perma.cc/E247
-S7KB].
228. THE EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE COMM'N, supra note 3, at 14.
229.

Bowman, supra note 205, at 76.

230. Id. at 74, 76.
231. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(2), art. VIII, § 2.

232. Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457, 459 (Mich. 1972).
233. Id. at 463, 467.
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justices who agreed with the dissenters in the original 4-3 decision replaced outgoing
justices.234
Since that time, the Michigan legislature, the state courts, and the executive
branch have all acquiesced in providing low-quality educational opportunities to the
children in Michigan as evidenced by the poor ratings for Michigan on K-12
achievement, school finance, and opportunity for success when compared with other
states. 23 s For instance, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected a school finance claim
against the state as a mere duplication of the original lawsuit.236 Moreover, the court
ruled that school districts in Michigan could not challenge the school funding system
because they are "creations of the state." 2 3 7 The Michigan Attorney General
published an opinion letter in 1985 that noted that the Michigan Constitution did not
protect education as a fundamental right. 2 38 Michigan also has a broken school
funding system that has tolerated substantial numbers of districts of all types-rural,
urban, and suburban-operating on a deficit, and that system has not been reformed
for more than two decades. 239 Michigan's neglect of its schools has resulted in
"abysmal" conditions in school facilities and consistently below-average
achievement for students across categories in the National Assessment of
Educational Progress. 240 As a result, Michigan's right to education serves merely to
provide access to a school building rather than to guarantee any substantive
protection of a quality education. 241
It is frightening to think about how even lower-performing states are providing
education given the widespread failure at ensuring a quality education in a state that
is merely below average. 24 2 Unfortunately, Michigan is not an outlier. Other states
lack judicial accountability for their educational opportunities and outcomes because
an array of states, including Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and Rhode
Island, have asserted nonjusticiability, separation of powers, and other reasons to
reject school finance lawsuits. 24 3 Plaintiffs have never prevailed in litigation

234. Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711, 711 (Mich. 1973); Bowman, supra note 205, at
68.
235.

Bowman, supra note 205, at 68, 70-71.

236. E. Jackson Pub. Sch. v. State, 348 N.W.2d 303, 305-06 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
237. Id. at 306-07.
238. Mich. Att'y Gen., Opinion Letter No. 6271 (Feb. 7, 1985).
239. Bowman, supra note 205, at 68, 71-72, 74.

240. Id. at 68, 74.
241. Id. at 68, 76.
242. See id. at 76.
243. Marrero v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110, 113-14 (Pa. 1999) ("[T]he relief requested
by appellants-including declarations that the Commonwealth has failed to fulfill its
obligations to provide an adequate system of public schools in Philadelphia . . . cannot be
granted because the matter is nonjusticiable."); Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch.
Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 408 (Fla. 1996) ("[T]he legislature has been vested
with enormous discretion by the Florida Constitution to determine what provision to make for
an adequate and uniform system of free public schools. Appellants have failed to demonstrate
in their allegations a violation of the legislature's duties under the Florida Constitution.");
Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1193, 1195 (Ill. 1996) (concluding that
"the question of whether the educational institutions and services in Illinois are 'high quality'
is outside the sphere of the judicial function" and holding that "[education] is not a
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regarding a state right to education in at least nineteen states.2 4 4 In addition, judicial
hostility to school finance litigation has increased following the Great Recession as
has legislative resistance to reform even when plaintiffs prevail, and this resistance
all occurred before the global health pandemic hit.2 45 Protecting a right to education
typically requires the cooperation of all three branches 24 6 and thus a closed
courthouse and a resistant legislature in a substantial number of states leaves many
schoolchildren an eviscerated right to education that may merely guarantee that they
can enter the schoolhouse door, even if that schoolhouse is crumbling.
Many states also forsake the laws and policies that would protect education as a
civil right by disregarding educational equity in education funding by failing to give
disadvantaged students the opportunities and resources that these students need to
compete successfully with their peers.24 7 A recent national study found that most
states do not provide the funding that would enable the highest-poverty children to
reach national average achievement outcomes on standardized assessments. 24 8 In
"numerous states," only the districts with the lowest poverty concentrations can
attain these outcomes and, in several states, high poverty districts lack "thousands to
tens of thousands of dollars" in funding that they would need to reach these
outcomes. 2 4 9
Ultimately, despite a right to education in the constitutions of all fifty states, "the
right to education is not what you think it is."250 Instead, a right to education leaves
many children stuck in substandard schools with little hope of acquiring the
knowledge and skills they need to function as engaged citizens and productive
workers in the United States while others receive a first-rate education that prepares
them to be tomorrow's leaders. Educational inequity and inadequacy are rampant
throughout the United States because federal and state law fails to protect education
as a civil right. Part III proposes complementary federal and state law reforms to
safeguard education as a civil right.

fundamental individual right for equal protection purposes"); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun,
662 A.2d 40, 55, 62 (R.I. 1995) (holding that the Rhode Island Constitution's education clause
does not confer a fundamental right to education and that "the level of state educational
funding is largely a matter for the Legislature"); La. Ass'n of Educators v. Edwards, 521 So.
2d 390, 394 (La. 1988) (holding that "the legislature possesses the sole authority to set the
level of funding of the 'minimum foundation program"' required by the Louisiana
constitution); Bowman, supra note 205, at 69.

244. Appendix: School Finance Litigation Cases, in THE ENDURING LEGACY OF
RODRIGUEZ: CREATING NEW PATHWAYS FOR EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note
13, at 275, 277.
245. Black, supra note 185, at 427; Bowman, supra note 205, at 69; William S. Koski,
Beyond Dollars? The Promises and Pitfalls of the Next Generation of EducationalRights
Litigation, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1899, 1907-15 (2017).
246. Bowman, supra note 205, at 66.
247. See Cynthia G. Brown, From ESFA to ESSA: Progress or Regress?, in THE EVERY

153, 165
(Frederick M. Hess & Max Eden eds., 2017); Robinson, supra note 3, at 329.
248. See BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., THE REAL SHAME OF THE NATION: THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF INTERSTATE INEQUITY IN PUBLIC SCHOOL INVESTMENTS 38-39 (2018).
249. Id. at 1-2.
STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT: WHAT IT MEANS FOR SCHOOLS, SYSTEMS AND STATES

250.

Bowman, supranote 205, at 66.
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III. THE LEGAL ARCHITECTURE TO PROTECT EDUCATION AS A CIVIL RIGHT
Federalism in the United States is increasingly understood as an integrated system
of governance with interwoven boundaries between federal, state, and local
governments. 2 Although state and local governments remain primary in education,
they govern within the constraints of federal law and policy and with the critical
support of federal financial assistance.21 Thus, it is as true for education today as it
is for other policy areas that "[n]o important activity of government in the United
States is the exclusive province of one of the levels." 2 3
Protecting education as a civil right must harness the strengths of having federal,
state, and local support for and authority over education. The federal government has
consistently taken the lead in protecting civil rights in the United States and should
enact and enforce the laws and policies that are needed to safeguard education as a
civil right.2" However, just as federalism constrained past efforts to advance equal
educational opportunity,25 5 federalism is likely to constrain some of the ways that the
federal government protects education as a civil right. Therefore, it is important to
design the appropriate role for state involvement in achieving this aim because
federal efforts will necessarily require state support and cooperation.
In this Part, I recommend a set of complementary federal and state law reforms
that would protect education as a civil right. These laws provide only one of an array
of possibilities for safeguarding education as a civil right. Effective implementation
of these laws would require courts and legislatures to articulate the right and the
elected branches to enforce the right.2 6 I propose what I think the law should be
while simultaneously acknowledging the federalism constraints that will likely limit
federal involvement in these efforts.
Throughout this Part, I continue to emphasize the creation of robust rights, rather
than simply laws, policies, or practices that would improve education. Rights remain
central to this analysis because "[r]ights give us a moral vocabulary with which to
express our aspirations for education for democratic citizenship, and by extension,
for a more just society. They also empower individuals to lay claim to the education
they deserve here and now." 257 Programs and practices lack the legal, political, and
persuasive heft of rights. Therefore, it remains critical that laws and policies create
and protect a civil right to education rather than simply adopt and implement

251. See Bridget A. Fahey, Federalism by Contract, 129 YALE L.J. 2326 (2020); Heather
K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1890
(2014); Cristina M. Rodriguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism:Institutional and
PopularPerspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094, 2097 (2014).
252. Robinson, supra note 14.
253.

MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF

THE UNITED STATES 8 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1996).

254. See Robinson, supra note 14 (arguing that the federal government should serve as the
ultimate guarantor of equal access to an excellent education).
255. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The High Cost of Education Federalism, 48 WAKE

FOREST L. REV. 287 (2013).
256. Abrams, supra note 35, at 14.
257. NEWMAN, supra note 20, at 116.
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education reforms and programs, although reforms and programs can provide an
essential support to a civil right to education.
A. StrongerAntidiscriminationProtections ofEducation as a Civil Right
Many equate civil rights with nondiscrimination. Although Part I explains why
this understanding of civil rights is too narrow, federal and state laws fail to provide
effective nondiscrimination protections for education. The federal government and
the states should strengthen their prohibitions of discrimination in education and
expand enforcement of civil rights laws for education.
1. The Federal Government Should Strengthen Antidiscrimination Protections for
Education and Expand Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Protections
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 serves at the forefront of the battle for
civil rights2 5 and as the primary vehicle for protecting civil rights in education.2 5 9
Yet, for the reasons noted in Section IIA, it falls short of offering effective protection
from discrimination. At least four law and policy reforms should be adopted to help
this critical statute establish comprehensive protection from discrimination in
education. These reforms focus on remedying disparate impact discrimination
because most, but not all, modern day discrimination is not intentional, or at least
typically cannot be proven to be intentional. 260 The disparate impact approach can
also help to dismantle systemic racism in ways that focusing on intentional
discrimination cannot. First, Congress should amend Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 to explicitly prohibit disparate impact discrimination and provide a private
right of action to enforce it. Congress should also offer training to states and districts
on the best practices for remedying disparate impact discrimination, just as it did for
desegregation through Title IV of the Civil Rights Act. Second, Congress should
amend Title VI to affirm the Attorney General's authority and intent to bring lawsuits
to enforce the statutorily-enacted prohibition of disparate impact discrimination.
Third, Congress should increase funding to the Office for Civil Rights to enforce
Title VI. Finally, the Office for Civil Rights should issue guidance that addresses the
shortcomings of the disparate impact legal standard that can drive more efficacious
administrative and judicial enforcement of the standard.
First, Congress should amend Title VI to proscribe disparate impact
discrimination and create a private right of action to enforce this proscription. 261

258. Tony LoPresti, Realizing the Promise of Environmental Civil Rights: The Renewed

Effort to Enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 757, 761 (2013)
("As courts continue to close off channels to civil rights litigants, agency action on Title VI
rises in importance. In an administrative state that allocates hundreds of billions of dollars in
federal assistance each year, Title VI may be the most critical battleground in defining the
ongoing legacy of the civil rights movement.") (footnotes omitted).
259. See COLE, supra note 96, at 1.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 100-14.

261. See Michael T. Kirkpatrick & Margaret B. Kwoka, Title VI DisparateImpact Claims
Would Not Harm NationalSecurity A Response to Paul Taylor, 46 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 503,
511 (2009) ("Congress should amend Title VI to explicitly allow a private right of action for
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Alexander v. Sandoval's holding that plaintiffs may not enforce disparate impact
prohibitions through a private right of action broke with longstanding tradition that
embraced private enforcement of disparate impact claims under Title VI. 2 6 2 The
consistency of this tradition is undeniable: "all Cabinet-level federal funding
agencies, along with many smaller agencies, have ... issued rules and guidance under
Title VI outlawing disparate impact discrimination." 263 In litigation, disparate impact
claims challenged an array of education policies such as school funding, testing
regimes, and discipline policies. 264 Given the great difficulty in proving intentional
discrimination, 2 5 Congress must reinvigorate this important weapon for civil rights
by explicitly prohibiting disparate impact discrimination and authorizing a private
right of action to enforce this prohibition.
Along with this amendment, Congress should support enforcement of the
disparate impact prohibition by amending Title IV of the Civil Rights Act266 or
adding a similar provision to support remedying disparate impact discrimination.
Title IV provided essential administrative support for advancing desegregation as the
South undermined and resisted it.267 It authorized the Secretary of Education to
provide technical assistance to a district to adopt and implement a desegregation plan
if a school district or state requested such assistance. 268 It also enabled the Secretary
to provide grants to a school board to train teachers and other school personnel to
assist in desegregation and to hire a specialist to support desegregation. 26 9 Title IV
empowered the Secretary to provide financial assistance to higher education
institutions that provide training institutes to teachers or other elementary and
secondary staff "to deal effectively with special educational problems occasioned by
desegregation." 270 Those attending such institutes on a full-time basis could receive

claims of discrimination based on disparate impact. . . . [S]uch legislation is necessary to
eliminate discrimination in federally-funded programs in circumstances where the disparate
treatment theory is inadequate to establish liability."); Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the
CourthouseDoors to CivilRights Litigants,5 UNIV. PA. J. CONST. L. 537, 555 (2003) ("[T]here

are avenues for reopening the courthouse doors to civil rights litigants. . . . For example,
Congress, by statute, could amend Title VI to overcome Alexander v. Sandoval and allow suits
to enforce the regulations which prohibit recipients of federal funds from engaging in practices
with a racially discriminatory impact.").
262. 532 U.S. 275, 285-86 (2001); Black, supra note 130, at 356.
263. COLE, supra note 96, at 10 & n.80 (listing all federal disparate impact regulations by
Cabinet level departments and some smaller federal agencies).
264. See, e.g., Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting a motion to dismiss
a disparate impact claim against the Pennsylvania school funding scheme); Larry P. v. Riles,
793 F.2d 969, 981-83 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding a Title VI disparate impact claim against
tests used to place students in classes for individuals with significant intellectual disabilities);
Losen, supra note 117, at 283 n.220 (discussing investigation by the Office for Civil Rights
into a school discipline policy with a racially disparate impact).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 101-14.

266. Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c to 2000c-9.
267. Gary Orfield, The 1964 Civil RightsAct andAmericanEducation, in LEGACIES OF THE
1964 CivIL RIGHTS ACT 89, 102-03 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000).

268. Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2.
269. Id. § 2000c-4.
270. Id. § 2000c-3.
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a stipend for their attendance, and the Secretary could provide a travel allowance to
support attendance. 1
Building off of the Title IV model, Congress should offer support for remedying
disparate impact discrimination by providing both technical and financial assistance
to states and districts to empower and support their efforts to remedy it. This support
would aid in addressing the harms that occurred to civil rights when Sandoval moved
the education policies that impose a disparate impact2 72 beyond the reach of civil
rights law unless OCR intervenes. 273 As was the case in the 1960s, those who face
disparate impact discrimination today will need the assistance of the federal
government to transform a prohibition of disparate impact discrimination into an
educational culture in which superintendents, administrators, and teachers routinely
examine their educational practices to ensure that they are not imposing an avoidable
disparate impact on the basis of race, color, or national origin. Educators today would
benefit from in-service training from higher education institutions to learn about
reforms that remedy disparate impact discrimination in the most impactful way, just
as Congress recognized the need for institutions of higher education to train teachers
and other staff to implement desegregation.2 74
Second, Title IV of the Civil Rights Act should be amended to affirm the Attorney
General's authority and intent to bring litigation under the statutorily-enacted
disparate impact provision. Title IV authorized the Attorney General to bring a civil
action to desegregate a school district if he or she received a written complaint that
a child's equal protection rights were being denied.2 75 The civil action could be
brought if the Attorney General certified that the complainants were unable to pursue
legal recourse and the lawsuit would advance the "orderly achievement of

271. Id.
272. Sarah Albertson, Comment, The Achievement Gap and Disparate Impact
Discrimination in Washington Schools, 36 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 1919, 1940-41 (2013)

("[T]he primary causes of the disparities in school performance are rooted in the policies and
procedures of the school systems themselves, such as inequitable distribution of skilled,
experienced teachers and insufficient and inequitable school funding. These policies and
practices are neutral-nondiscriminatory-on their face but have a disproportionately
deleterious impact on students and communities of color."); Sam Spital, Note, Restoring
Brown's Promise of Equality After Alexander v. Sandoval: Why We Can't Wait, 19 HARv.

BLACKLETTER L.J. 93, 111 (2003) ("The Sandoval decision, of course, has a potentially
devastating impact for efforts to rectify educational racism in numerous areas, not just highstakes testing and school finance. If the decision does indeed mean that private litigants can
no longer bring suits based on § 602 disparate impact regulations, it erects a virtually
insurmountable barrier for private plaintiffs seeking to use federal law to redress racial
discrimination in disciplinary exclusions, special education programs, and tracking
programs.").
273. For instance, discipline policies often times impose a disparate racial impact that OCR
retains authority to address. Jason P. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison

&

Pipeline, 93 WASH. UNIV. L. REv. 919, 957 (2016); Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice

Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Dear ColleagueLetter on the Nondiscriminatory
Administration of School Discipline (Jan. 8, 2014), www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr

/letters/colleague-201401-title-vi.html [https://perma.cc/76ZX-XTMW].
274. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-4.
275. Id. § 2000c-6.
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desegregation." 276 The United States bore any litigation costs for the desegregation
suit as if it was a private litigant. 277 President John F. Kennedy proposed this
provision because it was "unfair and unrealistic" for parents and others to bear the
costs of litigation. 278 He also noted that those who sought to end discrimination did
not possess the financial resources to sustain the necessary litigation and lacked "the
ability to withstand the personal, physical and economic harassment which
sometimes descends upon those who do institute them." 27 9 Similar legislation should
be enacted to make clear that the Attorney General can and will enforce the
statutorily-enacted disparate impact prohibition and to remove the burdens of such
litigation from the backs of those who are harmed by disparate impact discrimination.
Third, OCR needs sufficient resources to launch an effective enforcement strategy
to reduce disparate impact discrimination. 2 0 Over the last twenty years, Congress
has appropriated less funding for OCR than the President's budget requested sixteen
out of twenty times. 281 In the sixteen times that Congress provided less funding than
the President requested, Congress provided on average more than $7.3 million less
than the President requested with more than $30 million as the largest gap and close
to $2 million as the smallest gap. 28 2 Congress must increase its support of OCR's
efforts to address the prevalence of disparate impact discrimination. 28 3
Finally, OCR should issue new guidance about how the disparate impact standard
should be enforced that addresses the shortcomings in how the standard has been
applied in the past. 284 At minimum, the guidance should adopt a more rigorous
threshold for educational necessity by requiring educators to prove that the

276. Id.
277. Id. § 2000c-7.
278. Katy J. Harriger, The Civil RightsAct of 1964 and School Desegregation:A DoubleEdged Sword?, 6 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 157, 175 (2016) (quoting 109 CONG. REC.
Hi1,176 (daily ed. June 19, 1963)), reprinted in RAYMOND J. CELADA, DESEGREGATION OF
PUBLIC SCHOOLS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE IV OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF

1964, at

LRS-2 (Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service 1967).
279. Id.
280. George, supra note 134, at 520.
281.
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(2019),
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/JA5U-K77L]; Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-94, 133 Stat.
2534, 2586-97 (2019) (referring to the Department of Education Appropriations Act, 2020),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 116th-congress/house-bill/1865/text?format=txt
[https://perma.cc/6EDH-MEKY]; U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., EDUCATION DEPARTMENT BUDGET
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TABLE:
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1980-FY
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PRESIDENT'S
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(2018),

[https://perma.cc/CC32-FAF5].
www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/history/edhistory.pdf
Congress has only appropriated more funds than the President requested in fiscal years 201820.
282. Calculations based upon data from tables in note 281.
283. The Department of Justice Educational Opportunities Section actively works with
OCR to enforce Title VI and Title IV. See EducationalOpportunities Section, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/crt/educational-opportunities-section
[https://perma.cc
/V2QD-4ZR3]. Therefore, additional funding for this section of the Department of Justice also
would strengthen enforcement of disparate impact prohibitions.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 146-57.
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challenged practice is essential for achieving educational goals. OCR should also
encourage the adoption of educational approaches with less of a disparate impact that
achieve the same goals by emphasizing that adopting less harmful approaches is an
important, anticipated, and beneficial goal of applying the disparate impact standard.
An array of examples that illustrate when an education practice is and is not
necessary coupled with more enforcement should drive school districts to adopt such
practices.
History also indicates that new OCR guidance that reinvigorates the disparate
impact standard will influence how courts interpret the standard. During
desegregation, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) influenced
how courts interpreted their obligations to ensure desegregation because when HEW
issued guidance, some federal courts adopted the substance of the guidance as the
essential requirements for desegregation. 285 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, which had jurisdiction over the most recalcitrant southern states when it
came to desegregation, adopted HEW's 1966 regulations that required effective
desegregation of both students and faculty that created integrated schools as the
appropriate judicial standard.28 6 As a result, "[t]he HEW standards under the Civil
Rights Act became constitutional standards and moved the courts toward the
momentous conclusion that the Brown decision required uprooting the entire
structure of southern education." 287 Federal courts today may also follow the lead of
OCR if it chooses to strengthen the interpretation of the disparate impact standard
because OCR serves as the only entity that has consistently enforced this standard
since its adoption.
A robust federal regime to define and enforce a prohibition on disparate impact
discrimination could go a long way in protecting education as a civil right. Intentional
discrimination has become unacceptable only because the law has deemed it to be
so. It will take increased understanding, widespread support, and enforcement of the
disparate impact prohibition to make disparate impact discrimination a thing of the
past. The next Section examines the state reforms that could complement stronger
federal antidiscrimination laws and enforcement.
2. How States Should Expand Their Antidiscrimination Protections for Education
Each and every state can expand protections for education as a civil right by
adopting a comprehensive approach to ending discrimination in education. States
should take several steps to accomplish this, including building on examples from
other states that have adopted broad proscriptions of discrimination.
First, states should adopt a broad proscription of discrimination in education. This
would close the gaps in the patchwork of current coverage.288 States can model their
language after other states with broad coverage that would prohibit discrimination in
everything from admissions, to course offerings, to discipline. For instance, a New
Hampshire law states that "[n]o person shall be excluded from participation in,
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287.
288.
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denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination in public schools because of
their age, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, race, color, marital status, familial
status, disability, religion or national origin . . . "289 This all-inclusive language
covers the full scope of educational access and opportunities rather than the limited
coverage of some state prohibitions.
Second, states should expand the definition of discrimination to cover disparate
impact and unintentional discrimination. Oregon provides a far-reaching definition
of discrimination: "'discrimination' means any act that unreasonably differentiates
treatment, intended or unintended, or any act that is fair in form but discriminatory
in operation, either of which is based on race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation,
national origin, marital status, age or disability." 2 90 This approach and similar
approaches could be used for states to prohibit disparate impact discrimination.
Third, states should elevate the importance of the state prohibitions of
discrimination in education by adopting these prohibitions in state constitutions.
Although state constitutions can be amended, they typically require more steps for
adoption than a statute.291 Including a broad proscription of discrimination in a state
constitution sends a signal to educational institutions and the public that ending
discrimination stands as a core value of the state and a priority of its citizens.
Fourth, states that expand their civil rights protections should offer both technical
and financial assistance to districts and schools to aid in their understanding and
enforcement of these laws. Technical assistance to districts and schools helps to
ensure that administrators, teachers, and staff understand these new obligations.
Technical assistance should highlight best practices and successful models for
remedying discriminatory practices. States should also offer financial assistance to
support districts that dedicate staff to identify when and how disparate impact
discrimination exists and how to remedy it. This combination of technical and
financial assistance would empower and incentivize many districts to change their
discriminatory practices.
Finally, states must adopt a comprehensive approach to enforcing state civil
rights. Enforcing new and existing civil rights protections for education in a
consistent and sustained manner should persuade states and districts to prioritize
enforcement.
This proposed array of state laws would complement federal laws in ways that
would remedy inadequate protection from discrimination in education. The next
Section considers how a substantive right to education could complement these
protections from discrimination to protect education as a civil right.

289. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:27 (Supp. 2019).
290. OR. REV. STAT. § 659.850 (2017).
291. See Mann K. Levy, Packing and Unpacking State Courts, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1121, 1151 (2020) (citing COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, BOOK OF THE STATES 2018, tbl. 1.3)

("The states have different requirements for amending their constitutions but, by and large, it
is an easier lift, politically-speaking, to enact legislation than it is to change one's
constitution.").
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B. Creatingand Protectinga Positive Right to Education
Although robust nondiscrimination laws provide essential protections to
schoolchildren, they alone would not safeguard the rights of children to a civil right
to education that aims to "protect those aspects of our natural capabilities most
conducive to social participation and well-being."2 92 To accomplish this broader
understanding of a civil right to education, the United States needs a set of
complementary federal and state laws that would protect a positive right to education.
1. The Federal Role in Protecting a Right to Education
The federal role in protecting a right to education must operate within the
constraints of our nation's federalist system. The nation's approach to education
federalism emphasizes state and local control over education and a circumscribed
federal role. 293 This approach has too often served as a barrier to equal educational
opportunity in the United States. 294 However, this historical reality does not have to
prevent the United States from adopting a more efficacious approach to federalism
that enables-rather than hinders-protection of education as a civil right. My
scholarship has proposed a long overdue disruption and restructuring of education
federalism to promote equitable access to an excellent education, 295 as has the work
of others.2 96
Even if a restructuring of education federalism occurs, federalism concerns are
likely to hinder recognition of a robust federal right to education for a variety of
reasons. My new edited book, A FederalRight to Education:FundamentalQuestions
for Our Democracy, provides analyses from leading scholars regarding the
arguments both for and against a federal right to education, how a right might be
recognized, and what it could guarantee. 297 A full discussion of those ideas is beyond
the scope of this Article. For purposes of this Article, it is important to understand
that any recognition of a federal right to education-whether through legislation, a
judicially implied right, or a constitutional amendment-must confront the reality
that the nation's approach to the federal role in education, at least currently, favors a
reduction in the federal footprint rather than an expansion. 298 Even when the national
appetite for expanding the federal role in education returns, that appetite will always
be tempered by those who strongly believe that the federal government should limit

292. WEST, Supra note 27, at 217.
293. See Robinson, supra note 14, at 962.
294. See Robinson, supra note 255.
295. See Robinson, supra note 14.

296. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 206, at 40-53 (proposing an expansion of the federal
role in education to create "a federal floor of minimal educational quality").
297. See A FEDERAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR OUR
DEMOCRACY, supra note 2.
298. Derek W. Black, Abandoning the Federal Role in Education: The Every Student
Succeeds Act, 105 CALIF. L. REv. 1309, 1336 (2017); Eloise Pasachoff, Doctrine, Politics, and
the Limits of a Federal Right to Education, in A FEDERAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION:
FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 84, 88.

20

2020]

LGAL ARCHITE CTURE_ TO PROTECT EDUCA TION

97

its role in education and the challenges of implementing federal objectives through
state actors. 299
Additional factors may prevent the recognition of a robust federal right to
education. Some will favor a limited scope for a federal right to education to preserve
state authority over education and state and local flexibility to serve as laboratories
of democracy.300 Others will insist that any increase in the federal role in education
should focus on creating and strengthening specific programs rather than a federal
right.3 01 Scholarly and political debate and disagreement about the content of a right
to education would also hinder recognition or adoption of a robust federal right to
education.3 0 2
Although these constraints must be acknowledged in considering how a federal
right to education might be recognized or adopted, they should not end the pursuit of
a federal right to education because such a right helps to protect our national interests
and to promote human flourishing. As a democratic nation, the United States relies
on an educated citizenry as the very foundation of our government.303 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly acknowledged this essential role for schools.304 For instance,
the Court has noted that since our nation's earliest history we have understood that
"some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively
and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and
independence."3 05 Despite the longstanding understanding of education as essential
to our democratic government, the states are not ensuring that students receive the
education they need to participate effectively in democracy. 3 06
In addition, education provides the essential tools for preparing students for the
workforce. 307 States are also falling short in ensuring education serves this role.
States are tolerating and too often creating educational inequities that hinder the
nation's ability to sustain a strong economy and to compete effectively in the global
marketplace. 308 The nation's inadequate state education systems result in high costs
from the criminal justice and healthcare systems. 309 The federal government must
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take action to address these national aims for education. A federal right to education
provides a workable and flexible pathway for ensuring education serves both of these
critical roles.3 1
Therefore, a federal right to education must balance federalism constraints against
the need for federal intervention to protect education as a civil right. This balancing
should guide the federal government in providing at least three essential protections
through a federal right to education. First, the federal government should recognize
a federal right to education that requires states to provide the foundational
educational opportunities necessary to be an engaged and effective citizen and a
productive worker. To create engaged and effective citizens, the United States must
build consensus around the essential knowledge and skills needed for civic
participation, which Michael Rebell explores at length in his recent book Flunking
Democracy: Schools, Courts and Civic Participation.For example, students must
possess both civic knowledge, such as knowledge of the structure of the political
system in the United States and their role in this system, and civic skills, such as the
ability to comprehend and analyze an array of complex knowledge. 311 In addition, a
federal right to education should require a floor of educational opportunity that
equips students to gain employment upon graduation. This requires students to gain
the analytical, literacy, numeracy, and problem-solving skills that modern
employment requires and that too many states are not providing.3 1 2
Second, a federal right to education should require states to provide educational
opportunities in an equitable manner. The states do not consistently include equity
among their priorities. 313 The federal government possesses a superior and more
consistent track record on ensuring equity in educational opportunities.3 1 4 The federal
government is overdue for setting some minimum requirements for an equitable
system for funding education, including ensuring low-income students and
communities receive more education funding to enable them to compete effectively
with their more affluent peers and insisting that school funding systems are linked to
the desired educational opportunities and outcomes rather than merely political
convenience and residual budgeting.3 15 A federal focus on equity would include
continuing the focus on closing the opportunity gap that is evidenced in the
reauthorizations of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.3 1 6 These two
components of a federal right to education would ensure a basic level of educational
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adequacy and equity while still providing ample room for state and local
experimentation, accountability, and flexibility.
Finally, to ensure that a federal right to education provides these two protections,
students and their families must have access to a federal forum to allege that a state
has failed to guarantee these foundational educational opportunities in an equitable
manner. Federal accountability helps to ensure that states do not neglect federal
priorities. Without it, states can be quick to accept federal benefits, such as funding,
while neglecting federal aims and programs. 317 Unfortunately, state legislatures often
neglect the educational needs of poor and minority students and cater to wealthier
and whiter interests. 318 Judicial review sometimes provides the most effective means
for enforcing individual rights.3 19 The centrality of education to effective
participation in democracy and in the workforce may require courts to step in when
state legislatures fail to protect the federal right to education.3 2
In addition, my past work has recommended a collaborative approach to a federal
right to education in which the federal and state governments work together to protect
the right.321 The collaborative approach requires a federal panel or commission to
review and provide research-based recommendations to states based on state reports
of their protection of a federal right to education.3 2 2 Technical and financial
assistance should accompany federal accountability to expand state capacity to
implement comprehensive reforms.3 23 Ideally, courts would serve as a last, but
important, resort for students and families to remedy state failures to offer equitable
access to educational opportunities that enable them to engage in civic participation
and to prepare to enter the workforce.
These three federal components of a federal right to education would help to
ensure that all students receive a minimal floor of educational adequacy and equity.
This approach aims at only a baseline of educational opportunity due to the
federalism constraints noted above. It leaves the pursuit of educational excellence
and high levels of adequacy to the states, as explained below. Moreover, if federal
courts choose not to build upon the recognition of a federal right to education in Gary
B. 3 24 and instead refuse to open the federal courthouse to lawsuits challenging
inadequate and inequitable educational opportunities,325 states will have to fulfill the
aims outlined above as well as the goals noted below that are best fulfilled at the state

level.
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2. The State Role in Protecting a Right to Education
Even if the federal government protects a right to education that prepares students
to engage in democracy and to enter the workforce, states will remain in the driver's
seat for education. This is because a federal right to education should aim only to
accomplish foundational national goals. States should focus on achieving an array of
additional state goals through state rights to education, such as pursuing educational
excellence by preparing students for higher education, ensuring students receive a
high-quality opportunity to learn, and providing accountability to enforce education
rights through a cause of action. States may diverge in pursuing other goals, such as
school choice, but the goals noted below should serve as building blocks for all
schools.
States can and should drive the United States toward excellence in education. This
focus on educational excellence is more appropriate at the state level because a
federal push for excellence would require a complete overhaul of education
federalism. Building on the federal foundation of a right to education, states will
possess ample room to function as the laboratories that lead the United States to
higher levels of educational adequacy, improved educational opportunities, and
ultimately excellence.
States set the content and performance standards for their states, and most states
have adopted college and career ready standards.3 2 6 However, it is commonly known
that there is wide variation in the quality of the standards.3 27 A study by the American
Institutes for Research used international benchmarking to compare what students
are expected to know in different states. 3 28 It found that the gap in standards between
states with high and low standards represents as much as three or four grade levels.
Indeed, "this 'expectations gap' is so large that it is more than twice the size of the
national black-white achievement gap,"32 9 which has been the focus of education
law and policy reform for generations.3 3 0 State rights to education can help to close
this expectations gap by demanding that states adopt rigorous approaches to
adequacy that prepare students to be prepared not just for gainful employment, but
to gain entrance to and graduate from postsecondary education and successfully enter
the middle class.
Second, states and localities maintain control over school funding, the
qualifications and distribution of teachers, learning resources, such as textbooks and
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technology, course offerings, and the quality of facilities. State legislatures can
ensure that states provide the high-quality educational opportunities needed to
achieve robust education standards by adopting opportunity-to-learn standards.
Opportunity-to-learn (OTL) standards establish the in- and out-of-school resources
students need to master the content in state content standards.3 3 1 They can be used to
guide district and school allocations of resources and reduce the opportunity gaps
that drive the achievement gaps. OTL standards can be designed to insist on excellent
educational opportunities rather than merely the basics. If state legislatures are
unwilling to hold themselves accountable, state courts could insist that legislatures
adopt comprehensive OTL standards as they enforce state rights to an adequate
education. Federal OTL standards were attempted but eventually repealed, as I have
explained in prior work.3 3 2 The consensus needed to adopt OTL standards is more
attainable at the state level and thus could be an important and unique state
contribution to protecting education as a civil right.
For instance, states could adopt OTL standards for school funding. OTL standards
can guide states as they determine the funding that is essential for student attainment
of the knowledge and civic goals for a state right to education. Robust
implementation of these standards could guide states in remedying the primary
shortcomings of school funding that I have outlined in prior work: "lower funding to
districts serving students with greater needs, . . . insufficient linkage of funding
systems to desired educational outcomes, . . . low funding levels, and . .. inadequate
oversight of state funding systems." 333 As states implement these standards, they
must identify the necessary revenue sources and distribute funding equitably for not
only basic programmatic goals but also additional funding for students with unique
334
learning needs, technology, facilities as well as innovation and improvement.
Finally, achieving an excellent education system will require the cooperation and
involvement of all three branches of government.3 35 Schoolchildren and families
must have access to courts to remedy inequities and inadequacies in educational
opportunities. State courts must ensure that state legislative and executive branches
are fulfilling their responsibilities to safeguard education as a civil right. Therefore,
many states must open or reopen their courthouse to claims that a positive right to
education has been violated.
Together, these state reforms would guide the United States to move beyond laws
to protect schoolchildren from harm and aim for educational excellence. Educational
excellence for all children could serve as the ultimate guarantor of education as a
civil right. Educational excellence also empowers schoolchildren to flourish in ways
that the basics do not.
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CONCLUSION

The United States is long overdue for turning the rhetoric of education as a civil
right into a reality. The United States lacks the federal and state laws to protect
education as a civil right, whether one embraces the nondiscrimination understanding
of a civil right or the broader understanding of a civil right as protecting the ability
to engage in social involvement and well-being.3 3 6 Federal civil rights protections for
education fall short of protecting education as a civil right because they limit judicial
remedies to intentional discrimination, set an exceedingly difficult bar to prove
intentional discrimination, and underfund OCR's enforcement of disparate impact
discrimination protections. The U.S. Supreme Court also rejected the invitation to
protect a positive right to education in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.3 3 7 State laws also fall short of protecting education as a civil right because
state civil rights laws provide a patchwork of protections that leave many children
with inadequate protection from discrimination. State rights to education similarly
vary in strength and enforceability that leave some children with no redress for
substandard educational opportunities.
Federal and state law should be reformed to protect education as a civil right. The
current narrow approach to a civil right emphasizes nondiscrimination. Given the
difficulties of proving intentional discrimination, federal law should focus on
revisions to law and policy that strengthen the disparate impact standard, remedy,
and enforcement. Congress should shore up existing nondiscrimination protections
by explicitly prohibiting disparate impact discrimination, providing a private cause
of action to enforce the prohibition of disparate impact discrimination, supporting
technical and financial assistance to remedy policies with a disparate impact,
affirming the Attorney General's authority and intent to enforce the statutorilyenacted disparate impact prohibition, and expanding the capacity of OCR to enforce
the disparate impact protections. State civil rights laws also should be reformed to
protect students from discrimination in all aspects of education, adopt protections
from discrimination within state constitutions, expand district expertise in complying
with these laws, and increase enforcement of state civil rights laws. Even reforms
that accomplished this narrow nondiscrimination definition of education as a civil
right would be a vast improvement over existing laws.
Finally, to protect a broad right to education that "protect[s] those aspects of our
natural capabilities most conducive to social participation and well-being," 338 the
federal and state governments should adopt complementary approaches to a positive
right to education. Within federalism constraints, the federal government should
adopt a right to education that requires states to provide students with the knowledge
and skills they need to be engaged citizens and productive workers, that guarantees
equitable educational opportunities, and that offers a private right of action. State
governments should build on this federal foundation by pushing the United States
toward educational excellence by adopting rigorous education standards, developing
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comprehensive opportunity-to-learn standards, and providing a judicial remedy for
the state's failure to protect a civil right to education.
The federal and state law reforms that are needed to protect education as a civil
right are within the nation's reach. These reforms are needed more than ever as the
United States tackles the educational impacts of the coronavirus. The words of
President Kennedy apply equally to our time:
Our progress as a nation can be no swifter than our progress in education.
Our requirements for world leadership, our hopes for economic growth,
and the demands of citizenship itself in an era such as this all require the
maximum development of every young American's capacity. 3 3 9
The United States must develop the legal architecture to protect education as a civil
right to forge a prosperous path for our future. 34 0
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